Conflict Impact Assessment of EU Development Co-operation with ACP Countries

A Review of Literature and Practice - Manuela Leonhardt

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- Contribute to policy objectives for security sector reform;
- Develop a conflict assessment methodology and practical working tools for analysing conflict and defining objectives in development co-operation;
- Tackle the proliferation and misuse of small arms

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ISBN 1898702060

Table of Contents

List of tables

Origins and purpose of this review

The first version of this report was prepared for the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) as part of a project by Saferworld and International Alert on Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA). Project leaders are Eugenia Piza-Lopez (International Alert) and Paul Eavis (Saferworld). The project aims at supplying the donor community with a tool for PCIA. This research paper presents the background to an international expert seminar on PCIA, which will provide a forum for recognised experts, key practitioners and Southern organisations to review current thinking and practice.

About the author

Manuela Leonhardt is a researcher on peace and development at International Alert. She has conducted extensive field research on ethno-politics and conflict management in the North Caucasus, which she is currently working into a doctoral dissertation at University College London. Previously, she worked as a researcher and consultant in West Africa for various organisations, including the German Association for Technical Co-operation (GTZ). She has published papers on socially sustainable development in West Africa and conflict prevention in the North Caucasus.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Eugenia Piza-Lopez, Paul Eavis, Cynthia Gaigals (Saferworld), and David Nyheim (Forum for Early Warning and Early Response, FEWER), who all provided valuable comments. The section on policy approaches to conflict prevention and peace-building benefited from conversations with Susan Brown (Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA), Doris Danler (Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Daniel Maselli (Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Caroline Poldermans (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Ilari Rantakari (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Evita Schmieg (German Ministry for Economic Co-operation), David Wiking (Swedish International Development Agency, SIDA), Jan Vanheukelom (Belgian Administration for Development Co-operation), Robert Walker (Department for International Development, DfID), and Michael Zilmer-Johns (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Special thanks are extended to all of them for sharing their time and insight.

Executive Summary

This paper reviews the latest conceptual and practical approaches to integrating a conflict prevention and peace-building perspective into development co-operation. It identifies good practice and lessons learned, necessary for the development of a PCIA tool.

Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) is a planning and management tool that helps development practitioners to mitigate conflict and promote peace in a systematic manner. It provides an integrated approach to the main stages and levels of a development programme. PCIA is being developed in response to a number of frequently expressed needs:

- developing a **strategic framework** for conflict prevention and peace-building work in a country at risk, based on a thorough understanding of the conflict, that enhances coherence and co-ordination between different actors and instruments;
- identifying and addressing the **root causes of conflict** and promoting local capacities and **opportunities for peace** through development co-operation;
- assessing, monitoring and mitigating the **potential negative consequences** of a development intervention in a latent or manifest conflict;
- assessing and mitigating the **conflict risk** to a development investment.

A review of existing good practice suggests that conflict-oriented development interventions are most successful when they:

- acknowledge the potential for positive change inherent in social conflict, and support channels for conflict stakeholders to find a shared **positive definition of peace**;
- integrate **conflict resolution and peace-building values** into programme implementation itself, and rely on **ethical principles** or codes of conduct for guidance through difficult decisions;
- use a **flexible planning framework** that allows planners to adapt to different types and stages of conflict and react to rapid changes in their environment;
- co-ordinate a **wide range of instruments and actors** based on their comparative advantages;
- address **security risks**, **local capacities for peace** and the **structural root causes** of conflict in a **balanced** manner.

A number of key elements for PCIA which address these challenges emerge from the literature. This suggests that PCIA should be an integrated tool that supports decision-makers in **analysing information** and **making strategic choices** for development work in areas at risk of violent conflict. The aim is to promote development activities designed to mitigate the risk of conflict and advance peace. PCIA achieves its full potential when it is integrated into the Project Cycle Management (PCM) or other planning processes. It should be an instrument that allows for the consultation and participation of a wide range of stakeholders. The following steps outline the main elements of a PCIA tool encompassing the macro and the micro level:

1 Conflict analysis

Conflict analysis provides a picture of a country's conflict risks and identifies the main factors creating potential for conflict at the macro and micro level. Conflict analysis also includes an assessment of conflict trends and peace opportunities. Conflict indicators should be used to monitor problem areas, which may be precursors of conflict. Because of the strategic importance of conflict mitigation, it is desirable to achieve a shared analysis of the main conflict issues and trends with a wide range of interested parties.

2 Stakeholder analysis

Planning can be improved by systematically looking at the stakeholders in a conflict, identifying their positions towards it, and evaluating their capacities for peace. Stakeholders at the local, national, regional and international level should be considered, including those who actually wage war. This permits identification of the actors best suited to address the main conflict factors on the basis of their interests and capacities. A mapping exercise can contribute to greater co-ordination between different agents when conducted in a participative manner.

3 Choice of strategic objectives and instruments

From the analysis of the major root causes of conflict, the conflict trends and relevant actors, strategic peace objectives can be set. These objectives should address the main root causes of conflict in a comprehensive way that takes account of their interaction. It can then be determined what range of instruments and measures are most suited to implement the objectives. At this point, it is important to go beyond development co-operation and consider complementary trade, financial, diplomatic and military instruments. The aim should be to achieve maximum coherence and synergy between the different forms of intervention.

4 Drawing up a country strategy

Country strategies should clearly outline the main strategic issues, establish a cascade of objectives from macro level to micro level and from short term to long term, identify the main instruments and actors, and contain a realistic time frame.

5 Risk assessment

When appraising a project proposal in a situation of potential conflict, consultations with project stakeholders play a central role in identifying and mitigating potential conflict risks. Conflict also poses a high risk to the intervention itself. Risk assessment should include the specific nature, location and timing of the intervention as well as the level of official and community support for it.

6 Conflict indicators for monitoring and evaluation

The conflict indicators established during conflict analysis and project appraisal stages guide the monitoring and evaluation of the intervention. Besides monitoring the project outputs, attention should be paid to the unintended effects of the project on the local peace situation. For this to be successfully achieved, it is important to review not only the project objectives, but also the way in which projects are implemented.

Glossary of Terms

Conflict prevention in the European Commission (EC) terminology refers to actions undertaken over the short term to reduce manifest tensions and stall the outbreak, continuation or recurrence of violent conflict. Such measures address the dynamic factors of conflict.

Human security signifies not only protection from violence, but also from wider threats to physical well being and livelihood such as environmental degradation, disease, and economic collapse.

Impact: The actual effects of an intervention, both intended and unintended, on the lives of its beneficiaries and other stakeholders, beyond the immediate project outputs. Within the Logical Framework, outputs correspond to the project objectives, while impact refers to the general goal.

Peace: Conflict prevention and peace-building activities need to follow a compelling and realistic vision of peace (Reychler 1998). Undoubtedly, the first priority must be achieving **negative peace**, that is the cessation of violent acts. This can provide space for negotiating the nature of a **positive peace**, from which all parties can benefit. Recently, the concepts "human security" and "structural stability" have been put forward to outline the content of positive peace.

Peace-building in EC terminology focuses on the root causes of conflict with a long-term perspective. Activities support institutions capable of providing equitable access to political decision-making, economic resources, social networks and information, and mediating social conflict.

Structural stability is "a situation involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures, healthy social and environmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resorting to violent conflict" *(Commission of the European Communities 1996)*.

Referencing style

Harvard system with full bibliographic references for the named works available in the bibliography at the back of this document.

I Background

Most contemporary violent conflicts take place in developing and poor countries. The costs are immense and can disrupt a country's development efforts over years or even decades. They include human suffering, expenditure on humanitarian, peace-keeping, commercial and reconstruction operations, and political fall-out. In the Rwandan genocide of 1994, an estimated 800,000 persons were killed and more than 2 million forced to flee their homes. Between 1990 and 1995, Rwandan exports dropped by 60% due to internal instability *(Killick / Higdom 1998).* During the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 145,000 were killed, 174,000 injured, and 2.5 million people made refugees. Bosnian GDP plunged from an estimated $ 10 billion to $ 2 billion between 1990 and 1996, while the costs of reconstructing Bosnia have been estimated at several billion dollars (ibid.). The rising number of conflict-related humanitarian emergencies also diverts scarce resources from long-term development to humanitarian assistance. Whereas in the 1980s emergency relief accounted for only 3% of the total development co-operation budget of the OECD countries, the proportion had risen to 10% in the 1990s. Simultaneously, the total value of international assistance fell sharply. These trends have prompted a **rethinking of the aid-security complex**.

(i) **Socially sustainable development:** Cases such as Rwanda, where well established development structures were not able to impact on the scale of genocide, raise fundamental questions about the type of development that is being supported. There is an increasing consensus that development aid should foster structures that are both economically and socially sustainable. Conflict prevention objectives, therefore, should be part of long-term development strategies which include economic, social, political and environmentally sound development.

(ii) **Negative effects of aid:** Aid frequently sustains forms of development that support elites and are dominated by them. Thus aid may often contribute to structural instability. In addition, in situations of conflict aid projects may inadvertently contribute to conflict while trying to achieve their internal objectives *(Anderson 1999).* This was the case in Somalia, where emergency aid for the victims of drought and war actually subsidised the warring factions. Even ordinary development projects can increase tensions. They may exacerbate existing rivalries through, for example, ignoring established patterns of land use or injecting resources into one impoverished region while neglecting another. Methods are required to monitor and redress these potentially negative effects of development co-operation.

(iii) **Reactive approach to emergency relief:** In the context of shrinking budgets, aid donors have been urged to revise their largely reactive approach to complex emergencies. Given the huge costs of war, it is suggested that aid can be a cost-effective way of supporting conflict prevention. For this to occur, donors need to identify and support opportunities for peace from an early stage. This approach is in keeping with a general shift in development thinking towards "enabling environments", which emphasise good governance, rights-based development, and a strong civil society.

A **new proactive approach towards development and violent conflict** poses new challenges to aid agencies, for which they require additional skills and tools, such as conflict analysis, conflict-sensitive planning, identifying peace constituencies, and monitoring the conflict impact of aid activities. There have been many calls for a tool to support agency staff in these tasks. Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) can provide a participatory method for systematically integrating a conflict prevention and peace-building perspective into development work.

II EU development assistance to conflict-affected countries – policies, instruments and lessons learned

2.1 Conflict prevention in EC development co-operation – a policy review

With an aid budget of $5.8 billion (1997), the European Commission (EC) is the second largest multilateral donor after the World Bank *(Costy 1999)*. Currently 90% of EC aid is released in grant form, which is appropriate for conflict-affected countries with poor short-term perspectives for economic growth, as it does not add to their debt burden. The EC thus has the potential to become an important donor for conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction.

Since the mid-1990s, the EC has been engaged in a process of developing policy frameworks and institutional capacity to deal with the new challenges posed by the violent conflicts of the post-Cold War period. Conflict prevention has been recognised as a central aim for both foreign and development policy. The **Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)**, established in 1997 by the Amsterdam Treaty, is becoming a significant EU instrument for conflict prevention at the political level. In relation to the ACP countries, **development co-operation** is given high importance as a conflict prevention instrument because of its capacity to address the long-term root causes of conflict. The **European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)** is also developing its profile in this area, particularly in post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction. To strengthen its analytical capacity, the EC set up the **Conflict Prevention Network (CPN)** as an international network of conflict-prevention and regional experts, whose expertise can be tapped to deal with specific policy questions.

The EC has produced a range of documents setting out its policy and practical approach towards development aid, humanitarian assistance, and conflict prevention.

Selected EC policy documents on conflict prevention and peace-building

- Conclusions on "Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa", adopted by the General Affairs Council on 4 December 1995;
- Communication from the Commission to the Council on "The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond (ICA)" of 6 March 1996;
- Communication from the Commission to the Council on "Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)" of 30 April 1996;
- Common Position and Council Conclusions on "Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa", adopted by the General Affairs Council on 2 June 1997;
- Resolution on "Coherence" (section "Peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution"), adopted by the Development Council on 5 June 1997;
- Conclusion on "The Role of Development Co-operation in Strengthening Peace-building, Conflict prevention and Resolution", adopted by the Development Council on 30 November 1998;
- Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on "Assessment and future of community humanitarian activities", 1999.

These documents delineate the EC mandate for conflict-prevention activities, set out a practical framework for conflict analysis, identify key policy areas and objectives, and provide guiding principles for action. In practical terms, three main areas for enhancing EC capacity for conflict prevention and peace-building have been identified:

- building the capacity for political analysis, focusing on the root causes of conflict;
- establishing comprehensive policy frameworks for countries and regions, containing priority areas and long-term options;
- creating an institutional framework for the adequate combination of political, economic, legal, social, environmental and, if helpful, military instruments.

The EC Commissioner for Development João de Deus Pinheiro summarised (1999) the essence of the EC approach to conflict prevention in the following five principles, which reflect some of the key challenges of conflict prevention and peace-building work.

EC principles for conflict prevention and peace-building in development

1. **Ownership**
   The EC recognises that local governments and communities bear the primary responsibility for conflict prevention, conflict management and peace-building. Outside assistance must build on local efforts, capacities and institutions, and create an enabling environment. Assistance to regional organisations (e.g. Organisation of African Unity, OAU), and civil society is central in this regard.

2. **Prevention**
   EC activities are committed to the early identification of potential trouble spots and a long-term approach to conflict prevention that focuses on the structural root causes of violent conflicts.

3. **Coherence**
   There is need for a comprehensive approach to the full conflict cycle. This requires coherent integration of diplomatic, military, trade and development EU instruments to create an enabling environment for peace.

4. **Early action**
   The gap between conflict analysis, early warning and action needs to be reduced through improved political analysis, decision-making processes and establishment of an international culture of conflict prevention.

5. **Co-ordination**
   More effective international co-ordination and co-operation needs to be encouraged, particularly in conflict-prone regions.

The principle of local ownership and local/regional capacity-building is a significant step towards developing a modern approach to development co-operation. There is, however, an inherent tension between the principle of local ownership and the call for more prevention, coherence and co-ordination. There is a risk that conflict prevention may extend the rationale for more far-reaching intervention into the internal affairs of developing countries, even when conflict is absent *(Costy/Gilbert 1998)*. This may not only contribute to destabilisation, but also raise fundamental questions about national sovereignty. It is recognised that the most appropriate means of addressing the lack of coherence, co-ordination and long-term orientation, which impairs the full potential of development assistance, is to return responsibility to the national societies and build their steering capacity *(UNDP 1998)*.

The EC has a number of **regional aid policy frameworks** for promoting peace through development co-operation and humanitarian assistance. They include:

- The **European Development Fund (EDF)**, directly released to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) governments under the Lomé Convention. Conflict prevention and peace-building have been integrated into the negotiation mandate for the new EU-ACP Partnership agreement ("Post-Lomé Convention");
- **Regional frameworks** with a focus on conflict prevention at the borders of the European Union such as the Stability Pact for Central and Eastern Europe, PHARE (Eastern Europe), TACIS (Former Soviet Union and Mongolia), MEDA (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership programme) and ALA (Asia/Latin America);
- **EC budget lines** with special geographic and sectoral focus mostly intended for implementation by NGOs. There is no individual budget for conflict prevention, and it is not yet explicitly included in country aid programming, project development, funding or assessment. Many budget lines, however, have been used for this purpose such as those for ECHO emergency assistance, food aid, aid to refugees, returnees and displaced persons, post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, aid for implementing the Israel/PLO peace agreement and human rights and democracy in developing countries.

The EC uses a number of funding mechanisms to address violent conflict. Among the most relevant are *(Costy 1999)*:

- ECHO emergency assistance, increasingly including post-conflict relief and rehabilitation work, drawn from the Commission budget (Chapter B7-21) and the EDF (1998: 517 million ECU);
- Rehabilitation in Africa and other developing countries, two budget lines (B7-3210 and B7-6410), from main EC budget (1994-97: 190 million ECU);
- Assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced persons under articles 254 and 255 of Lomé Convention (1991-97: 100 million ECU);
- Assistance to uprooted people in Asia and Latin America (B7-2120), including rehabilitation and reintegration of refugees and ex-combatants, from EC budget (1997: 40 million ECU);
- Food aid (B7-2), within framework of wider food security policy (1997: 80 million ECU).

Besides these general mechanisms, the EC has provided targeted rehabilitation support to a number of post-conflict countries. These include:

- Rehabilitation Programme Somalia (1994-1997), 39 million ECU
- Rehabilitation Programme Liberia (1994-1998), 80 million ECU
- Rehabilitation Programme Haiti (1995-1998), 25 million ECU
- Rehabilitation Programme Eritrea (1995-1998), 16 million ECU

The EC is currently working towards strengthening its institutional capacity to respond to conflict. This includes development of a number of policy tools such as evaluation guidelines, methodologies for early warning and PCIA as well as a "Practitioner's Manual" to assist practitioners in identifying and implementing appropriate responses to conflict. It is important that these tools fit into Project Cycle Management (PCM), the central EC planning tool, which provides an integrated approach to the project cycle based on the Logical Framework (Commission of the European Communities 1993).

The six phases of the project cycle

1. **Indicative programming**
   Establishment of general guidelines and principles for co-operation between the EC and a partner country, including thematic and sector programming.
2. **Identification**
   Initial formulation of project ideas with the aim of preparing a feasibility study.
3. **Formulation (Appraisal)**
   Specification of the project objectives, results, and activities on the basis of a detailed feasibility study, examined by the EC to ensure coherence with its sectoral policies; serves as basis for financing proposal.
4. **Financing**
   Drafting of a financing proposal, decision taken by relevant committee within the EC, financing agreement.
5. **Implementation**
   Project implementation based on Plan of Operation, regular monitoring reports.
6. **Evaluation**
   Analysis of results and impact of the project during or after implementation; documentation of lessons learned for future projects.

During the last few years, other bi- and multilateral donors have also made significant progress strengthening their capacity to contribute to conflict prevention and peace-building. Appendix I provides a short overview of the current state of play in this area.

2.2 Conflict prevention and peace-building activities by the EC and other donors – an evaluation review

A substantial body of evaluation literature has emerged since conflict prevention has risen on the policy agenda of donors (see Bibliography). The evaluations of programmes of the EC and the Nordic donors in particular provide a wealth of information about the challenges of working in conflict-affected environments and the lessons which have been learned from the experience.

The first and most important lesson is that every intervention in a conflict-affected environment has an impact on the conflict – positive or negative. Much depends, however, on how assistance is delivered. Therefore, it is crucial for agencies to make conflict prevention a cross-cutting issue for development assistance to conflict-prone regions. This means avoiding the risks of inadvertently aggravating the conflict as well as seeking out opportunities for promoting more peaceful relationships. The following table maps out the main risks and opportunities of development and humanitarian aid to conflict regions as they emerge from the evaluations.

Table 1: Risks and opportunities arising from development and humanitarian aid in politically unstable situations

Thematic Area	Risks	Opportunities
1. Structural sources of conflict		
Socio-economic disparities	**Aid cements existing divisions** • inputs and services not distributed equally • aid allocation follows divisions created by the conflict, thus acknowledging and legitimising them • project staff primarily recruited from one particular group • most rewards to staff of one group	**Aid delivery encourages collaboration and cohesion** • focus on cross-cutting issues • provides opportunities for peaceful interaction **Aid promotes more equal opportunities** • resources targeted equally and fairly • support of rights and entitlements of disadvantaged groups • opening new opportunities through education and training
Natural Resources	**Aid encourages unsustainable use of natural resources** • regional concentration of aid encourages migration and local overpopulation • ecologically unsustainable agricultural, mining or industrial schemes **Aid supports contentious claims to natural resources** • formalisation of previously flexible and negotiated land tenure systems • control of important resources (eg water points) in hands of only one group (eg sedentary villagers)	**Aid encourages sustainable resource management** • regional spread of aid • analysis of and support for customary sustainable resource management • use of environmental impact assessment for project appraisal **Aid strengthens equal access to resources** • facilitation of negotiations on land and water rights,eg between pastoralists and sedentary farmers • legal frameworks for usufruct and other flexible resource use arrangements
Political exploitation of cultural and other differences	**Aid agency duplicates and reinforces war images** • staff adopts common images of "victims" and "enemies" • aid agency uses war rhetoric and images for fund-raising and publicity	**Aid agency supports overcoming distrust and reconciliation** • example for peaceful collaboration • activities involve confidence-building components • support for moderate voices
2. Capacity to deal with conflict constructively		
Good government and governance	**Aid reinforces illegitimate political structures** • material support for illegitimate governments • legitimisation of warlords, eg through negotiations **Aid weakens local governments by creating unsustainable parallel structures** • competition for sovereignty and resources between external agencies and national government	**Aid strengthens local formal and informal structures** • work with legitimate local leaders • integration into national administrative structures • adherence to national programmes • attention paid to post-project continuity with local resources
Pluralism and participation	**Aid replicates authoritarian structures** • imposition of external solutions for local problems • lack of consultation on project objectives and approach • "participation" understood as local people implementing the project and benefiting from it	**Aid encourages participation and local ownership** • support for representative civic organs • communities encouraged to take an active role in project planning, implementation and monitoring *(...continued overleaf)*

(…continued)

Table 1: Risks and opportunities arising from development and humanitarian aid in politically unstable situations

Thematic Area	Risks	Opportunities
Channels for conflict management	**Aid undermines local capacities and creates dependency** • responsibility taken away from local structures (eg kin networks), eg through rationing • beneficiaries treated as passive recipients • new dependency on aid delivery, including political dependence on middlemen and brokers	**Aid recognises local ownership of peace process** • clients as stakeholders • creates space for and carefully supports civil initiatives **Aid agency assumes engaged, but neutral position in conflict** • retains presence to witness • facilitating and mediating role
3. Security		
Warlords and arms	**Aid subsidises warlords** • direct payments (eg armed guards) • transfer of capital equipment (eg vehicles, communication hardware, partly through theft) • aid frees local resources for military use • aid releases local leaders from responsibility for civilian welfare	**Aid avoids subsidising warlords** • low profile intervention • no conspicuous assets **Aid develops alternative livelihoods** • productive capacities • trade networks • strengthen coping mechanisms

(adapted from Anderson 1999, Goodhand / Hulme 1997, Suhrke et al. 1997, DFID / Warner 1999)

Secondly, there is the question whether there is evidence that aid can actually have a positive effect on conflict. Most evaluations are very cautious in this regard and stress the limited impact of aid in general. However, there are some positive, although modest examples:

Examples of rehabilitation and development activities with a focus on conflict prevention

Situations of rapid change/refugees: In Malawi, communities that hosted a large number of refugees from Mozambique were provided with improved public services (health centres, schools, water points). These measures benefited both the local population and the refugees and so alleviated the stress put on local communities by the large numbers of refugees. This helped to ease the relations between both groups *(APT Consult 1998)*.

Socio-economic disparities: Funds for refugees were shifted toward the traditionally neglected Somali region of Ethiopia. The improved service provision in this unstable border zone reduced a traditional source of discontent *(COWI 1997)*.

Lack of access to natural resources: In Ethiopia, water projects improved the access of displaced pastoralists to water and thus mitigated an important source of conflict with sedentary populations *(COWI 1997)*.

Lack of pluralism and participation: In Mozambique, donors played a major role in keeping the elections on schedule and supporting the transformation of RENAMO from a rebel military movement into a political party *(Suhrke et al. 1997)*.

Need to reintegrate refugees: In Ethiopia, refugees were provided with extensive support to return to their lands. One of the aims of this measure was to forestall large-scale migration of refugees to the towns, which would lead to the further growth of crime-ridden and politically volatile shanty towns *(COWI 1997)*.

Situations requiring disarmament: In Mozambique, a programme has been established to collect and destroy arms in exchange for tools and other items for income-generation activities. This is supported by public peace education and training for volunteers, thus strengthening local capacities *(Suhrke et al 1997)*.

The evaluations examined offer a wide range of recommendations on how development and humanitarian agencies can strengthen their capacity to respond more constructively to conflict situations.

Lessons learned from peace-building experiences

1. **Need for clear peace-building objectives**

   Peace-building is not yet widely recognised as a development goal in its own right, but rather perceived as a positive side-effect. Setting clear peace-building objectives can bring enormous efficiency gains. Peace should not only be regarded as the absence of violence, but also encompass co-operation, reconciliation and development. A long-term perspective is crucial for the success of such efforts.

2. **Need for clear strategic frameworks**

   The major evaluations of conflict-related development argue that rehabilitation and development programmes can only make a substantial contribution to peace processes when they are planned and implemented in a coherent way. "Country strategies" or "strategic conceptual frameworks" can be useful instruments in this context. From the various evaluations, the following elements of a good country strategy can be gleaned:

   (i) A **long-term orientation** to address the full conflict cycle. An integrated **transition strategy** is needed that **links crisis response to development** and sets the signposts for long-term recovery. "Quick impact" solutions such as infrastructure rehabilitation or distribution of agricultural tool kits need to be integrated into long-term programmes for maximum sustainability. Priority should be given to social investment, which is fundamental to recovery and long-term development.

   (ii) **Coherence** and **co-ordination:** Representing the result of wide consultations, a country strategy should outline the roles of the external (and internal) actors based on the principles of comparative advantage and ensure maximum synergy among development, trade, political and military instruments.

   (iii) Given the apparent urgency of the problems, **local capacity building** is often not seen as a priority. However, it is crucial to involve communities and local administrations in decision-making and implementation processes which foster a sense of ownership. Local administrative and management capacities are also crucial to sustain development after foreign agencies have withdrawn.

Factors for success in peace-building The Norwegian Experience *(Sørbø et al. 1998)*

- sustained local presence through ongoing and long-term involvement
- thorough understanding of the conflict and its different dimensions
- long-term perspective
- good networks and contacts with important actors, including those not present at the negotiating table
- extensive flexibility for funding new initiatives emerging during the peace process

3. **Need to strengthen the institutional capacity of donor agencies**

   (i) Some evaluations note that development of a targeted and comprehensive approach to peacemaking and peace-building is often hampered by lack of **institutional structures to integrate and co-ordinate different policy instruments** (military, trade, policy dialogue, development aid, humanitarian assistance), both within and between donor and other agencies. Task forces for conflict-prone regions are suggested as a useful way of achieving inter- and intra-agency co-ordination *(COWI 1997)*.

   (ii) **Information, knowledge and skills:** In order to react to situations of conflict in a timely manner and with more appropriate instruments, evaluators recommend that donor agencies should facilitate the flow of information between the field and the country delegations and headquarters. This is particularly important for early warning. More could also be done to improve conflict analysis capacity within organisations, and to train staff in conflict prevention and peace-building skills. Peace-building advisors can be instrumental in mainstreaming conflict prevention and peace-building objectives within programmes.

   (iii) **Suitability of instruments:** The instruments (e.g. budget lines) which are used for conflict prevention and peace-building activities should be regularly monitored to reassess their suitability and efficiency.

   (iv) **Decision-making and project management:** Many evaluators argue that delays in the release of funds are particularly damaging in politically unstable situations. Sometimes, more attention is paid to pre-project controls than to effective implementation and impact. The procedures for project appraisal and approval need to be streamlined to guarantee efficient implementation of peace-building activities. On the other hand, managers should be able to provide co-ordination and real guidance for the implementing agency, in order to avoid duplication or the dispersal of resources over large geographical areas, to help avert negative side effects due to lack of co-ordination, and to maximise synergies between different activities. Reporting requirements should attach as much importance to programme content as to financial accountability.

Institutional innovation for co-operation with politically unstable countries: EC engagement in Somalia and Liberia

Somalia has been without a legitimate central government since 1991. After the failure of the UN system to provide effective leadership in Somalia became apparent in 1993, the EC assumed a leading role in the international effort towards stabilising and rebuilding the country. It designated a Special Envoy for Somalia with an unusually broad political remit. He chaired the Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body (SACB) from 1993 to 1997, and often acted as the spokesperson of the international community in Somalia. In the absence of a co-ordinating national government, the SACB developed policy guidelines for international engagement in Somalia. EC rehabilitation resources were mainly channelled to regions of relative stability for implementation by international NGOs and UN agencies. The EC took a proactive approach to reconstruction by supporting new forms of decentralised political government and a peace-building and reconciliation programme *(Visman 1998)*.

The EC provided crucial assistance to the **Liberian** peace process during the critical transition period from 1994 to 1997. After the closure of the EC Delegation in Monrovia in 1990, its involvement in Liberia was based on a unique delegation of responsibility by the Minister of Planning to the EC. Based on a comprehensive country strategy, EC aid aimed at reducing all economic and political risks to the peace process. This included an ongoing policy dialogue with all parties to the conflict and the complementary use of foreign policy instruments through the CFSP. The EC programme strongly focused on the coherent, efficient, and speedy delivery of high-quality aid. This required a number of institutional innovations such as tight management and financial control through the Brussels geographical desk, decentralisation of field operations, streamlined internal decision-making procedures, high levels of internal communication, contracting private companies for project implementation, and a long-term commitment to staff. Since the Liberian government has recovered strength, however, difficulties have arisen due to the lack of local participation in and ownership of the programmes *(Brusset 1999)*.

4. **Need to strengthen institutional capacity of implementing agencies**

International NGOs and UN agencies have become important implementers of aid in regions affected by violent conflict. However, most evaluators comment on the performance of NGOs rather than on that of the UN. It is recognised that NGOs offer a number of advantages for donor agencies:

- More flexibility where local government structures are absent or weak;
- Better capacity to identify appropriate projects because of local-level knowledge and experience;
- Closeness to grassroots and greater participation by local groups.

The strong reliance on international NGOs for conflict prevention and peace-building, however, also has a number of drawbacks:

(i) **Co-ordination:** The large number of NGO applications can badly strain the limited capacities of the donor administration and even more, those of the national administrations. The Norwegian Embassy in Mozambique, for example, administered over 900 aid disbursements in 1990-95, many of them through NGOs *(Suhrke et al. 1997)*. Overall programme co-ordination usually suffers in such a situation, so that international NGOs generally have scope to determine the project content themselves. Although this can be an asset, synergies may be lost.

(ii) **Relationship with local administration:** Several evaluations show that the multiplicity of NGOs and their diverse programmes can overburden local counterparts, particularly when a young and fragile government is just emerging from conflict. In the early 1990s, for example, the Mozambican authorities were expected to co-ordinate the activities of over 2,000 foreign NGOs. Given such numbers, local governments, NGOs and communities can often be marginalised in project design and implementation. Disregard for locally defined programmes and priorities can incapacitate local authorities in a situation where all effort should be spent on strengthening legitimate bodies. In a few extreme cases, NGOs have even established themselves as quasi-administrations for whole regions, creating conflicts with local structures over sovereignty and resources. Many donors are now channelling funds directly to reasonably well-performing national or local governments.

(iii) **Competition with local civil society:** International NGOs sometimes compete with local organisations and, enjoying greater resources and networks, stifle the development of local civil society. On the other hand, they can play a positive role in building or enhancing the capacity of local NGOs. While donors have often developed good working relationships with international NGOs, they should not lose sight of the crucial role local civil society can play in stabilising volatile situations. More and more experience is now being gained through directly funding Southern organisations.

(iv) **Short time frames:** Many evaluators have remarked that NGOs usually have to operate within extremely short time horizons, which are inappropriate to the long-term task of peace-building *(COWI 1997)*. Donors should try to redress this problem by enhancing their own long-term planning capacity. Some NGOs also lack qualified staff and have poor quality control mechanisms and low standards of service delivery.

5. **Priority areas**
   Peace-building projects need to be based on an intimate knowledge of local conditions and thorough needs assessment. To ensure sustainability, they should be planned and implemented with a maximum participation of local communities within the framework of national government structures and development plans. Priority areas for supporting sustainable peace are **security sector reform**, **social-economic integration**, support for **legitimate and pluralistic political institutions**, and the **building of local capacity** *(Suhrke et al. 1997)*.

2.3 A role for PCIA

This brief discussion of the major lessons learned from donor experiences with conflict prevention and peace-building highlights a number of possible aims and roles for PCIA. From a Northern perspective, the following needs have become apparent:

- Tools for **conflict monitoring** and **conflict analysis**: Despite recent attempts to install early warning systems, there is still much scope to streamline and systematise the flow of information about conflict trends, which already exists within donor organisations. Donors also need to diversify their sources of information to include more civil society voices. More internal capacity is required to analyse this information and translate it into relevant action.
- Framework to engage in **dialogue with the national government and society** on peace visions and development priorities. This can democratise the decision-making processes of donors, make it more transparent for counterparts and beneficiaries and enhance local ownership. Such an approach needs to be long-term and conscious of the contested nature of peace in a country divided by violent conflict.
- Tool for developing a **strategic framework** for assistance to conflict-prone regions. Strategic planning for conflict-prone regions poses particular challenges mainly due to the multiplicity of stakeholders, the fluid situation on the ground and the resulting security risks to operations. An inclusive strategic planning process, however, can enhance coherence, co-ordination and ownership of assistance to unstable areas.
- Tool to enhance existing **project management** instruments for work in politically unstable regions. Most project management systems have been developed with stable environments in mind. Conflict situations normally require more flexibility. There is also a need for **monitoring** and **evaluation** tools that assess both the process of development work and its impact on the likelihood of violent conflict. An enhanced capacity of development agencies to reflect on their work is crucial for institutional learning.

From a Southern perspective, PCIA methodologies could have the following purposes:

- Framework for **national or local dialogue** on peace visions and paths towards development. Peace processes can be strengthened by providing space for dialogue between different sectors of the society on perspectives and directions for the future *(Stiefel 1998, UNDP 1998)*. The results of such a dialogue can offer useful signposts for development planning both by the national government and donors.
- Framework to **engage national governments and donors** in (possibly neglected) issues of conflict prevention and peace-building: Local civil society may use PCIA methodologies to encourage conflict analysis "from below", develop strategic responses, and use these as a platform for engaging with policy makers. In a divided society, however, all conflict analysis invariably remains partial.
- Tool for **project management**: As for Northern organisations, PCIA can provide tools to strengthen the management capacity of Southern organisations, which are increasingly being asked to directly implement projects. This may lead to improved project proposals, more transparent implementation, and a clear assessment of project performance.

A range of tools may be required to address these different needs and tasks. For them to be effective, it is important to clearly define their purpose and scope. PCIA tools, however, should not be regarded as a panacea for the issues outlined in the evaluation review. Issues such as inadequate administrative procedures or willingness to assume a more political role in conflict situations need to be resolved at different levels. Moreover, the effectiveness of policy tools largely relies on user skills. The following review of frameworks and methods for PCIA largely focuses on the function as a planning and management tool for development programmes and projects.

III Frameworks, methods and indicators for PCIA

3.1 Conceptual frameworks for PCIA

The following table provides an overview of existing frameworks for integrating conflict prevention and peace-building objectives into programming and project management. Not all of them use the term "PCIA" or have been designed with this objective in mind. Distinctive methodologies have been developed to suit different tasks. Among them are:

a) **Indicator or issue-based analytical frameworks:** These have been designed mainly for decision-makers who want to gain a more systematic understanding of the conflict situation in a country, to facilitate macro-level planning. The aim is to take analysts through different conflict-relevant areas in a country's political, economic and social structure and help them to decide where and how aid could be used most strategically to address conflict causes. Indicator-based frameworks ask analysts to give ratings to predefined indicators and thus calculate sectoral "risk" scores (e.g. Spelten 1998). Issue-based frameworks (e.g. Bush 1998, Reychler 1998) are more open and invite the user to think through certain analytical areas such as context, systems, institutions, attitudes, forces for peace and conflict and reach strategic conclusions.

b) **Open frameworks for participatory consultation:** The core of these methodologies is consultation with and active involvement of the peace stakeholders in the analytical exercise. Such frameworks often rely on an analytical framework of the issue-based type, which is discussed and completed during one or a series of workshops (e.g. FEWER 1999). This methodology is useful for strategic planning processes both on the macro and the micro level. On the macro level, consultations mainly involve representatives of government, civil society and other interest groups. On the micro level, the methodology provides space for consultations with beneficiary groups and local stakeholders.

c) **Self-monitoring and impact research:** Given the process orientation of conflict prevention and peace-building work, conflict-sensitive strategic planning needs to be supported by an ongoing monitoring process, which takes account of the work process of the organisation as well as its impact on the conflict environment. Though still at an early stage, approaches are being developed that enable organisations to reflect periodically on their own ways of working ("reflexive monitoring") (e.g. Lederach 1997, CPCC 1999). These need to be complemented by periodic impact assessments of the organisation's work, for which social research and stakeholder consultations are the methods of choice. This form of continual information gathering can become crucial for crisis management, when the project has to deal with minor or major conflict-related difficulties.

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Table 2: Frameworks for PCIA

Author / Agency	Purpose	Rationale	Root causes / indicators	Methodology	Comments
Luc Reychler *Conflict Impact Assessment*, Univ. of Leuven, 1998	Conflict Impact Assessment (CIAS) (ex-ante and ex-post)	**Aims:** • assess the positive / negative impact of interventions on the dynamics of conflict • support more coherent conflict prevention and peace-building policy • sensitive tool for policy makers • make development and peace-building efforts more effective	**Conditions for sustainable peace:** • consultation and negotiation systems, of different levels • structural measures (democratisation, market system) • integrative moral and political climate (expectations of mutual benefits, multiple loyalties, reconciliation • security (objective and subjective)	**Policy level:** • clear vision of peace • comprehensive needs assessment: enabling and inhibiting conditions of peace • coherent action plan (actors, domains, measures, timing) • effective implementation (co-ordination, timeliness, funds) • inclusion of stakeholders in conflict • dismantling of the 'semi-mental' walls **Project level:** • integration of project into regional peace policy • assess impact of conflict on project (violence, political system, local support, other relevant actors) • assess impact of project on conflict (addresses conditions for peace, effective targeting, coherence and synergy) • generate alternative options and decision-making (modifications to raise 'peace added value')	**Strengths:** • stress on peace as development objective • structural and attitudinal conflict factors • good indicators for project appraisal and monitoring **Weaknesses:** • little indication on what a PCIA tool could look like
Kenneth Bush, *A Measure of Peace*, IDRC, 1998	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) (ex-ante and ex-post)	"**Any** development project set in a conflict-prone region will **inevitably** have an impact on the peace and conflict environment." "It is quite possible that a project may fail according to limited developmental criteria but succeed according to broader peace-building criteria," and vice versa	**Central question for PCIA:** "Will / did the project foster or support sustainable structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, recurrence, or continuation of violent conflict?" **Main areas of impact:** • institutional capacity to manage or resolve violent conflict and to promote tolerance and build peace • military and human security • political structures and processes • economic structures and processes • social reconstruction and empowerment Indicators should reflect different perspectives on peace-building	**Criteria for performing PCIA:** **Project location** in area with a history of violent conflict or in disputed territory **Pre-project PCIA** • **environmental risk assessment:** location, timing, political and economic context, legal and security structures, infrastructure, closing or opening opportunity structure • **project-related considerations:** support, trust and participation of community and political structures, right mix of resources, flexibility, staff **Post-project PCIA** **Conflict-relevant impact types:** • change in access to resources • creation or exacerbation of socio-economic tensions • change in food security and material subsistence • challenging the content of or control over existing political, economic or social systems	**Strengths:** • consideration of unintended impact of project **Weaknesses:** • does not provide practical tool

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Table 2: Frameworks for PCIA *(…continued)*

Author / Agency	Purpose	Rationale	Root causes / indicators	Methodology	Comments
DFID / Michael Warner, Discussion paper, 1999	Conflict Impact Assessment (CIA) (ex-ante, monitoring, ex-post)	"Mitigating the 'risks' that interventions will exacerbate, provoke, or be adversely affected by conflict, and exploiting 'opportunities' to facilitate local and national peace-building initiatives"	**Conceptual framework for CIA** 1. **Conflict related risks** A project can exacerbate open conflict and provoke latent conflict. Conflict can undermine the project objectives. 2. **Peace-building opportunities** The project iteslf or related mitigation measures can support local capacities for peace and contribute to structural initiatives for peace-building (structural stability, moral-political climate).	**Framework methodology for CIA** 1. **Strategic conflict analysis** Systematic country study to identify conflict-related risks and opportunities. Informs development of country strategy for peace-building, sector programming and project identification. Additional location-specific study. 2. **Screening** Cost-effective way of exempting low-risk projects (small size, short term, conflict-benign) from detailed CIA. Assuming that all projects are planned within framework of peace-building strategy. 3. **Preliminary CIA** Using checklists of indicators to rapidly check project ideas. Integrated into project cycle, also useful at a later state when new risks or opportunities emerge. 4. **Detailed CIA** Contextual conflict analysis with stakeholder participation, selecting and prioritising peace-building and risk-mitigation options, conflict management plan, capacity building programmes, consensual negotiation processes. For projects with high risks or opportunities, useful also at later stage for conflict mangement.	**Strengths** • most elaborate approach in terms of the practical integration of a Conflict Impact Assessment system into project cycle • open-ended approach, provides scope for own decision-making based on context knowledge **Weaknesses** • elemental conceptual framework
Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm,* Local Capacities for Peace Project, 1996, 1999	"Do No Harm" and "Supporting local capacities for peace" (monitoring)	"Identify ways in which international humanitarian and / or development assistance given in conflict settings may be provided so that, rather than exacerbating and worsening the conflict, it helps local people to disengage from fighting and develop systems for settling the problems which prompt conflict within their societies"	**Negative side effects of aid: Resource transfer** • resource transfer to warring parties through theft, taxation or diversion of aid • aid takes care of civilians and frees up resources for support of armies • control over food enables manipulation of individuals • external assistance distorts local economies • introducing scarce resources into a poor and divided area reinforces rivalries **Implicit ethical messages** • Acceptance of terms of war • Bestowing legitimacy on warriors • Undermining peace values • Reinforcing animosity	**Conflict-related issues on policy level:** • systems of delivering food aid • choosing local partners and targeting • interagency co-ordination • aid agency criteria for "success" (reflecting external rather than local priorities) **Conflict-related issues on project level:** Need to strengthen "connectors" and "local capacities for peace" on the levels of: • systems and institutions (legitimate and responsible local leaders) • attitudes and actions (cross-cutting contacts, co-operation in areas of mutual concern) • shared values and interests (reinforce inclusiveness and intergroup fairness) • common experiences (memory of former mutual respect and sympathy) • symbols and occasions	**Strengths** • valuable focus on the modalities of aid delivery • valuable focus on strengthening "local capacities for peace" **Weaknesses** • checklist of indicators rather than open-ended approach

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Table 2: Frameworks for PCIA *(…continued)*

Author/ Agency	Purpose	Rationale	Root causes/indicators	Methodology	Comments
Anne-Marie Laprise, *Programming for Results in Peace-building* CIDA, 1998	Performance Indicators for Peace-building (ex-post)	Providing a framework for evaluating peace-building programming, with a view to the introduction of Results Based Management (RBM) principles into the management practices of development agencies	**Main areas to measure peace-building:** • domestic capacity and propensity for the peaceful resolution of conflict • resolution of ongoing conflict and prevention of new conflicts • political, legal, security and civil society structures supporting a lasting peace • recovery of the country or region from the damage inflicted by war • women fully contribute to and benefit from peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction • understanding of and support for peace-building, at home and abroad	**Challenges of evaluating peace-building:** • lack of clear approach to peace-building • need for realistic objectives, accounting for high risks, defined in LogFrame • establishing causality • data availability **Project-level evaluation:** • measuring results according to LogFrame • indicators identified by all "those immediately responsible for producing results" • directional indicators for long-term processes **Policy/Programme-level evaluation:** • inappropriate to ascribe macro-changes to a single programme • rather "reveal how the situation has changed since the time of the interventions" and • "how that project will work with others to build the foundations for a lasting peace"	**Strengths** • excellent discussion of the methodological issues linked to monitoring and evaluating peace-building **Weaknesses** • innovative indicators, but overwhelming complexity and still prescriptive • fails to address the problem of monitoring unintended project impact
Angela Spelten, *Crisis analysis*, German Ministry for Economic Co-operation, 1998	Crisis analysis (early warning)	Support development planners in • assessing the risk of violent conflict in a certain country and identifying its probable lines • identifying measures contributing to long-term stability	**Conflict factors:** 1. **Structural conflict factors** structural disparities, social awareness of conflict, legitimacy of state institutions, external influences 2. **Accelerating factors** pressure for modernisation, policy changes, structural adjustment, land reform, resettlements, environmental conditions, resource competition, collectively perceived threats 3. **Triggering factors** polarisation within society, individual actors change political strategy, increasing use of force and violence	**Set-up of conflict analysis:** Using the three sets of conflict factors, countries can be classified into three conflict-relevant categories: • **stable potential for conflict** recommended action: attentive watching • **potential crisis escalation** recommended action: rigorous evaluation of development measures concerning their potential negative effects on conflict • **high potential for crisis and violence** recommended action: fundamental redirection of development aid **Conflict-related project monitoring:** • external environment • conflict recognition and flow of information • planning process • impact of development co-operation on conflict	**Strengths** • focus on risk assessment • useful indicators for monitoring conflict trends **Weaknesses** • prescriptive checklist approach • no provisions for identifying peace-building • no guidance for positive action

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Table 2: Frameworks for PCIA *(…continued)*

Author / Agency	Purpose	Rationale	Root causes / indicators	Methodology	Comments
Milton Esman, *Can Foreign Aid Moderate Ethnic Conflict?* 1997	"Ethnic impact statement" (ex-ante)	"Too many [development interventions], spurred by the logic of 'developmentalism' that ranks economic growth and modernisation above values such as democracy and interethnic fairness, have distributional effects that generate or aggravate ethnic conflict, as one community is perceived by its rivals to be benefitting at their expense."	1. **Comprehensive country or regional background analysis** • main ethnic communities (demography, identity, values, political power, economic roles, internal divisions) • interethnic relations (stratified / segmented, their recent history, cross-cutting affiliations) • relations with government, politicisation 2. **Estimate of project impact on ethnic relations** • identification of complementary measures or modification of project	1. **Define clear "allocation formula" in dialogue with all stakeholders. Options:** • **Common interests:** "positive sum outcomes for all the parties concerned and mutual confidence that benefits and costs are equitably shared" • **Divisibility:** equal territorial spread of aid measures, best with involvement of local people in project design and management to achieve a sense of ownership • **Interdependence:** "division of labour between ethnic communities rewards co-operative rather than competitive behaviour" 2. **"Ethnic conditioning" for aid policy** • respect for ethnic minorities and just distribution of aid precondition for co-operation with strongly discriminating government	**Strengths** • interesting approach to address problem of "distributional effects" of aid • provides options on how to take decisions about distribution **Weaknesses** • controversial proposal of aid conditionality for minority protection
FEWER, *Manual for Early Warning and Early Response,* 1999	Early warning and response development (ex-ante)	"The collection and analysis of information about potential and actual conflict situations, and the provision of poilicy options to influential actors at the national, regional and international levels that may promote sustainable peace"	**Steps for early warning:** 1. **Context analysis** descriptive analysis, geographic and historical factors, key actors and agendas 2. **Identifying conflict indicators** political, economic, socio-cultural, institutional 3. **Analysing the situation** classifying indicators into structural factors, accelerators, triggers, look for synergies and mitigation 4. **Identifying opportunities for peace** windows of opportunity in terms of events, mediators, facilitators, options and agenda items	**Steps for response development** 1. **Identifying instruments for conflict prevention** (political, economic, socio-cultural, on international, regional, and local level) 2. **Analysing potential peace actors and institutions** (appropriate to identified conflict prevention tools) 3. **Transforming the situation by stages** (establishing a time frame for suggested actions and actors) 4. **Towards viable and sustainable responses** (check response options in relation to their potential impact, position of key actors, alliance configurations, likely organisation or political changes, enhancing opportunity structures)	**Strengths** • excellent methodological approach to conflict analysis and developing positive action, relevant also for conflict analysis and development programming **Weaknesses** • needs to be adapted for development work

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Table 2: Frameworks for PCIA *(…continued)*

Author / Agency	Purpose	Rationale	Root causes / indicators	Methodology	Comments
Chris Roche, *Impact Assessment and Emergencies*, Oxfam 1999	Guidelines for impact assessment of emergency assitstance by NGOs (ex-post)	NGOs need to develop a more subtle analysis of the impact and outcome of their humanitarian assistance to be able to assess and advocate the positive effects more clearly	**Developing impact assessment indicators** • emphasis on monitoring and "impact tracking" • differential impact on groups (gender, age, class) • flexible use of indicators to account for changing circumstances • capture negative and unintended changes • include mortality / morbidity, protection and security, sustainability and connectedness with longer-term issues	**Impact assessment process** 1. Clarify **purpose** and **scope** of study 2. Clarify **assumptions** about how change happens 3. Choose appropriate **methods** (survey, interviews, workshops, observation, participatory rural appraisal tools) 4. **Participatory tools** • possible manipulation by powerful groups • respect people's time, priorities and trauma • clear standards for research process including confidentiality and cross-checking 5. **Policy and institutional assessment** • ethical analysis (duty-bound or goal-bound ethic) • organisational practices (accountability, staff support, analysis, co-ordination, participative planning, gender integration, security)	**Strengths** • tool kit for impact assessment in conflict regions, based on empirical research • innovative focus on policy and institutional assessment **Weaknesses** • potential impact of projects on conflict not directly addressed
Emery Brusset, *Verifiable Conflict Indicators*, 1999	Verifiable Conflict Indicators (ex-ante and ex-post)	Develop indicators that are "operational descriptions of the changes brought about by actions or key factors in a country's conflicts. They allow an assessment of the negative or positive impact of actions as well as of contextual factors."	**Indicators** 1. **Sovereignty** State discourse of the existential threats to its sovereignty 2. **Identity** Discourse of significant social groups on existential threats to their identity 3. **Resources** Means in the hands of the state and society to counter threats to sovereignty and identity. They include resources for violence (eg arms), strategic resources (eg control of important road) and easily distorted resources (eg land rights) Note: Only perceptions of "existential" threats are to be regarded as security risks	**Recommendations for the "verification" of these indicators** 1. **Micro-level** Monitoring identity and resource indicators in historical perspective, possible by long-term resident personnel (eg aid workers, international monitors, anthropologists) 2. **Macro-level** Monitoring identity and sovereignty indicators on level of political discourse, eg by diplomats, economists, journalists. Low reliability of macro-economic statistical data	**Strengths** • valuable development of indicators for "triggering" conflict factors **Weaknesses** • only focus on proclaimed attitudes and intentions of major conflict parties • neglect of local capacities for conflict management and peace-building opportunities

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Table 2: Frameworks for PCIA *(...continued)*

Author / Agency	Purpose	Rationale	Root causes / indicators	Methodology	Comments
Canadian Peace-building Co-ordinating Committee, *Towards a Lessons-Learned Framework for NGOs in Peace-building* 1999	Learning framework for peace-building by NGOs (ex-post)	"Contribute to learning by NGOs on peace-building in a way that promotes shared analysis and the development of practical tools and best practices"	**Definition of peace-building** "those peaceful interventions whose primary intent is to remove the root causes of armed conflict. These interventions should be impartial and culturally sensitive and should be convertible to follow-on initiatives and amenable to implementation, at the very last, in partnership with the recipients"	**Issues related to successful peace-building** 1. **Descriptive** Type of activity, goals, funding, context and history of conflict, timing, main actors 2. **Process** Contribution of different actors, project history 3. **Relational** Relation to other peace-building activities in the area (complementarity, interference) 4. **Evaluative** Self-evaluation (reasons for success and failure, unintended outcomes, control over outcomes, differential impact on men, women and children, external factors) 5. **Prescriptive** Integration into wider peace-building policies, lessons learned for other efforts	**Strengths** • basic tool of potential use for NGOs based on principle of self-evaluation • interesting focus on interaction between the project and its environment and its influence on outcomes **Weaknesses** • focus on evaluation instead of planning

3.2. Operationalising PCIA – lessons learned from practice

This brief review of existing approaches to PCIA shows that this work is still at a relatively early stage. Purpose, scope and level of the methodologies are sometimes still ill-defined, and many approaches can appear "heavy" in terms of complexity or necessary research input. This reflects the fact that few of these methodologies have been tested in practice so far. A number of challenges still need to be overcome to make the existing approaches fully operational. In this regard, much can be learned from other forms of impact assessment. Many development organisations have adopted formalised procedures for environmental, gender, social and poverty impact assessment. These assessments contributed to mainstreaming these important cross-sectoral issues and have helped to improve planning compared with previous practice. The experience with these forms of impact assessment offers a number of lessons, which should be considered when developing PCIA tools *(Alkire 1997, Goyder et al. 1998, DFID / Warner 1999, Roche 1999, World Bank 1999)*.

1. **Clear definition of purpose**
   The term "impact assessment" refers to the systematic analysis of the (long-term) effects of an intervention on its social or physical environment. In the context of development assistance, it has been used to describe both ex-ante and ex-post studies of such effects. From the practical experience of doing and following-up such studies, however, the term has also come to signify a comprehensive process of stakeholder engagement with the aim of avoiding negative effects of an intervention and achieving commonly agreed results.

Usage of the term "impact assessment"

- **Appraisal study** of the potential programme / project impact (ex-ante) on beneficiaries, e.g. Social Assessment in the World Bank;
- **Evaluation study** of the intended and unintended lasting effects of a programme / project on beneficiaries and stakeholders (mid-term and ex-post), e.g. Participatory Impact Assessment by ActionAid, Impact Assessment by Oxfam;
- **Project management tool** setting out a participative process of situation analysis, programming, project appraisal, and monitoring and evaluating activities, e.g. Gender Impact Assessment, Environmental Impact Assessment.

Apart from the timing of and approach to impact assessment, clarity also needs to be achieved as to the objectives of the exercise. Environmental Impact Assessment, for example, mainly seeks to detect and mitigate the potential negative effects of a project. Gender and poverty assessment, however, have moved beyond mere **risk assessment** and seek to adapt assistance to local needs taking full advantage of **local opportunities**. Sometimes, accompanying measures are identified to create an enabling environment for achieving certain objectives. Similar tensions exist in the present approaches to PCIA. Some methods focus mainly on identifying or mitigating the potentially harmful effects of development or humanitarian aid on a conflict *(Anderson 1999)*, while others are geared towards detecting or creating opportunities for the active promotion of peace through external assistance *(Reychler 1998, DFID / Warner 1999)*.

2. **Appropriate degree of complexity**

Impact assessment needs to be a thorough process, which takes account of the complexity of the local situation and the sometimes considerable risks of an intervention. However, it should also be a light tool that does not overburden busy staff with cumbersome procedures. For planning purposes, a useful solution to this problem is a **graded screening system** with a desk-based assessment procedure for lower-risk projects and a detailed assessment, including participatory consultation processes, for those with higher risks or opportunities *(DFID / Warner 1999)*. The World Bank operates a comparable screening system for social assessment. In the fiscal year 1998, for example, it performed detailed social assessment for around 30% of its projects *(World Bank 1999)*. Assessments can be simplified by using directional and qualitative indicators instead of quantitative measurements, which are difficult to verify in conflict situations.

World Bank screening criteria for social impact assessment

- **"high risk":** obligatory assessment of projects with significant social impact (involuntary resettlement, indigenous people, exclusion of vulnerable groups, politically controversial, high environmental risk)
- **"high opportunity":** recommended assessment of projects whose success depends on changes in the behaviour of individuals, groups and institutions, or direct community participation (large number of beneficiaries, targeted on poor and vulnerable, community development projects)

Checklists or issue-based analytical frameworks are often preferred for the first-stage assessment, which is usually undertaken within the development agency with a relatively low degree of consultation. These approaches have the advantage of being unobtrusive, quick and easy to complete. They risk, however, being inflexible and not appropriate for all types of conflict situations, and provide little space for contrasting voices. High-risk assessments require more intensive stakeholder engagement. Preferred methods are traditional social research, "rapid" appraisal techniques and participatory planning workshops, which provide space for voicing and negotiating the conflicting issues surrounding the programme or project. This latter approach is relatively time- and resource-intensive and therefore only recommendable when there are real concerns.

3. **Status within existing programming and management frameworks**

For impact assessment to be an effective mainstreaming tool, it needs to fit neatly into existent programming and management processes and systems. PCIA, for example, can be used to prepare country briefs, sector strategies or project planning. The LogFrame and Project Cycle Management (PCM) have now become the most widely used tools for project management. PCIA needs to be coherent, with the language and main phases of these tools being accessible to development staff.

Conflict prevention and peace-building work, on the other hand, present distinct challenges to traditional approaches to planning and managing development programmes and projects, which need to be reflected in PCIA methodologies. Firstly, working towards peace means supporting processes which are extremely unpredictable, full of set-backs, but also offer unforeseen opportunities. Therefore, PCIA should be a continuous and **flexible** process. Circumstances can change rapidly in conflict situations, and it may be necessary to modify a project once it is under way. Some opportunities for peace, on the other hand, may only emerge after working with local people for an extended period. Therefore, there should be room for major additions and changes to a project at later stages *(DFID / Warner 1999)*. Secondly, peace processes depend on a complex constellation of factors, on which external influence has a limited bearing. An isolated measure is therefore of limited use. PCIA should consider the **combined effects of the various interventions** in the same region and encourage a more concerted approach.

PCIA is sometimes perceived as an addition to an already lengthy list of impact assessments. To overcome this, it may be practical in some instances to use a common framework, which includes conflict, poverty, gender and possibly some aspects of environmental impact assessment. There are common issues around which such a framework could be built, for example the distributional effects of aid. Social assessment has already been used to map out the lines of potential ethnic or social conflict *(Kudat 1998, Mott 1998, Youssef 1998)*. Such a common framework would help streamline data collection and stakeholder consultations.

4. **Participation and local ownership**

Conflict prevention and peace-building work can only be sustainable if it involves or at least reflects the needs and concerns of those affected by the conflict. A participative approach is therefore even more pivotal in conflict than in traditional development contexts. As a tool, PCIA cannot resolve this issue alone, but it can help in setting the framework for such participation through an open and process-oriented approach. Experiences with poverty impact assessment have shown that this method is most effective when implemented as a **participatory** planning and monitoring process over the whole project cycle *(Goyden et al. 1998)*. Thus, the project can be better adapted to local needs and conditions. In conflict situations, however, great sensitivity is required in handling participatory processes. Much care must be taken to ensure that PCIA offers a **safe space**, in which different positions and demands can be aired without aggravating an already tense situation.

5. **Political and ethical dimension**

Impact assessment as a tool is an essential component of good planning, but it provides little guidance on how to deal with its results. This may involve difficult ethical and political decisions. A review of recent social assessments commissioned by the World Bank, for example, suggests that sometimes there is no real flexibility for revising programme objectives as a result of a social assessment. A study of the restructuring of the Russian coal sector concluded, for example, that the radical closure of coal mines would throw tens of thousands of Siberians into abject poverty and lead to political instability, while no single beneficiary could be identified. Mitigating measures for such a large number of people were seen as virtually impossible, particularly as the weakness of the Russian welfare system was fully recognised *(Kudat 1998)*. It seems, however, that the programme was to be implemented for the sake of economic efficiency.

Such dilemmas between contradictory values may be even more acute in conflict situations, where ever-present suffering and death make the consequences of certain decisions even more tangible. Sometimes, the only option seems to be choosing the lesser evil. PCIA can serve to inform such decisions to the best possible degree, recognising that ethical guidance has to originate from different sources. Such situations also demonstrate that planning can only be partial, while much depends on forces outside the control of the agency.

IV PCIA for EC development co-operation – elements for an integrated framework

4.1 Overall framework for PCIA

An integrated set of PCIA tools could enhance the EC's response to situations of potential or actual violent conflict. Such tools can provide guidance with policy development, project planning and management to ensure resources are targeted in the most strategic way at the main causes of conflict. To achieve such a comprehensive approach, PCIA should be integrated into the following phases:

1. **Policy development:** detailed conflict analysis on the country and regional level, to serve as a baseline for drawing up a country peace-building strategy ("indicative programming" in EC terminology) and subsequent sector strategies (macro-level, ex-ante).
2. **Project planning:** identification and appraisal of individual projects or programmes based on the country strategy, considering additional project and location-specific information, project risk assessment (micro-level, ex-ante).
3. **Project implementation:** monitoring and evaluation of projects and programmes, based on the objectives and outcomes defined in the previous stages, but taking into account the changing peace environment, particular attention paid to unintentional impact of aid (macro- and micro-level, ongoing and ex-post).

Not every country is to the same degree at risk of violent conflict, and there are project types which are more likely to cause conflict than others. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to use scarce resources and staff time for detailed PCIA of low-risk countries and operations. As discussed in the previous section, a two-stage PCIA including a **screening system** as suggested by *DFID / Warner (1999)* could also be a viable approach for the EC.

(i) **Country level:** All countries should be submitted to an indicator-based conflict analysis, which mainly relies on published sources of information and knowledge already present in the organisation. A detailed conflict analysis would only be recommended where there is evidence of tensions. This would include an in-depth study of the country situation involving expert and stakeholder consultations. In either case, the information gained through the country analysis should be fed into the strategic planning process for the given country. In-depth analysis can also help develop strategic priorities and indicators for the subsequent screening of development programmes and projects in high-risk countries.

(ii) **Programme and project level:** A screening system can also be useful for the programme and project level. Screening can help identify high-risk and high-opportunity initiatives, for which a detailed PCIA is obligatory. A detailed analysis should also be undertaken of all initiatives in regions that have been identified as prone to violent conflict. As on the country level, it is important that (detailed) PCIA should be an integral part of the project planning and appraisal process rather than being added at the end, when substantive changes can no longer be made. This exercise would aim to gear planning processes more systematically towards preventing conflict and building peace.

The following table illustrates how a graded PCIA process can be integrated into the main phases of the programming and project cycle.

Table 3: PCIA within the Programming and Project Cycle

Phase	PCIA element	Outputs
Country programming	Preliminary conflict analysis (indicator based) Detailed conflict analysis (consultation) Programming	• Country conflict risk assessment • Stakeholder mapping • Conflict-related risks and peace-building opportunities • Strategic objectives and choice of instruments • Country strategy
Project planning and appraisal	Preliminary PCIA Screening Detailed PCIA	• Conflict risk assessment • Measures for risk mitigation and peace-building • Exemption categories • Priority areas • Participatory conflict analysis • Conflict management plan • Accompanying measures
Project implementation	Monitoring Detailed PCIA for crisis mangement	• Participatory conflict indicators • Monitor peace-building impact and unplanned effects • Risk mitigation and peace-building measures
Programme and project evaluation	PCIA performance assessment	• Lessons learned and implemented

(adapted from DFID / Warner 1999)

The remainder of this chapter discusses the conceptual and methodological aspects of developing such a PCIA system.

4.2 Conflict analysis

Both on the country and project level, PCIA relies on a detailed conflict analysis based on solid local knowledge. The challenge is that violent conflicts are caused by an array of interrelated factors, involve many actors, and rarely follow any standard pattern. The following conceptual tools can help understand conflict patterns and conflict factors more clearly, recognise the roles of the different participants in the conflict and discern windows of opportunity for peace.

4.2.1 Conflict models

For analytical purposes, conflicts can be subdivided into distinct phases. The EC (1996:4) and the DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development (1998:7) have adopted the following four-stage model of the conflict cycle.

The conflict cycle



(adopted from Costy / Gilbert 1998)

1. **Normality and Peace:** A country is apparently stable, but may structurally be prone to conflict. At this stage, risk assessments can identify the main background conditions and provide policy directions for long-term stabilising measures.
2. **Rising Tensions:** Conflict becomes manifest, tensions and mutual suspicion are high, but violence is still sporadic. Conflict analysis should reveal the accelerating factors and show opportunities for short-term preventive initiatives.

3. **Open Conflict:** There is a high level of violence, and peaceful options are (temporarily) abandoned. Reactive measures seek to contain violence and protect the civilian population. Proactive measures should identify opportunities for peace-making and address the factors perpetuating conflict.
4. **Post-conflict Transition:** Hostilities have ceased, but political, economic and social uncertainties prevail. Old and new structural tensions need to be analysed and addressed in reconstruction and long-term development programmes.

This widely used model deserves some cautionary remarks. Firstly, clear progressions are rare, and most conflicts oscillate between two or three of these stages, often over years or even decades. The "open conflict" stage can include varying degrees of violence from drawn-out guerrilla warfare to full-scale war. There are also regional variations in the intensity of conflict, with one part of a country being calm and violence periodically flaring up in another. Second, the determinism inherent in the "vicious" conflict cycle may draw too much attention to events-management and allows little space for searching for structural alternatives that can break the cycle. Third, the apparently clear-cut phases of the conflict cycle detract attention from the crucial movements from one state to another. However, it is just these central, but frequently overlooked passages which offer most scope for conflict prevention activities *(Costy/Gilbert 1998)*. Nevertheless, the stage-model is a valid tool for clarifying the dynamics of a conflict situation, looking at underlying structural factors, and developing a comprehensive approach addressing all stages of the conflict cycle in a coherent manner.

To explain why violent conflicts happen, most conflict theories distinguish between structural factors (or "root causes"), accelerating and triggering factors *(e.g. Davies/Gurr 1997)*. Given the extreme protractedness of modern conflicts, "perpetuating" factors may be added to this list. Perpetuating factors explain why violence is so difficult to halt once it has broken out. Operating with these types of conflict factors helps determine the trends of a dynamic conflict situation and reach conclusions about its development in the near future.

Conflict factors

1. **Structural factors** include political, economic and social patterns such as state repression, the lack of political participation, poor governance performance, the distribution of wealth, the ethnic make-up of a society, and the history of inter-group relations. They increase a society's vulnerability to conflict.
2. **Accelerating** or **triggering factors** often consist of political developments or events which bring underlying tensions to the forefront and cause the situation to escalate. They can include new radical ideologies, repression of political groups, sharp economic shocks, changes in or collapse of central authority, new discriminatory policies, external intervention, and weapons proliferation.
3. **Perpetuating factors** contribute to the continuation of violence. They may include war economies, a high concentration of (small) arms, professional and/or impoverished fighters, deep-seated mistrust and **vendetta**-thinking.

This approach encourages the analyst to think through the relative significance of different conflict causes and establish explicit links between them. Such a rigorous analysis is particularly important when defining priorities for intervention. However, it is also important to avoid the temptation of artificially separating complex conflict factors into a neat temporal scheme.

Because of its orientation towards development, aid is best positioned to address the structural causes of conflict, although it also has an important role to play in mitigating accelerating and perpetuating factors.

4.2.2 The root causes of violent conflict

To identify strategic priorities for conflict prevention and peace-building, it is useful to clarify the structural conditions which make a particular country vulnerable to violent conflict. The EC chose to call these conditions the "**root causes**" of conflict. The assumption is that, although root causes and problem areas are highly context-specific, there are certain features typical of situations of violent conflict. In its conclusions, the Council of the European Union (1998) outlined four such root causes of conflict.

The EU Council's root causes of violent conflict

- imbalance of political, social, economic and cultural opportunities among different identity groups;
- illegitimate, non-democratic governments and ineffective governance;
- absence of mechanisms for peaceful conciliation of group interests and for bridging the dividing lines between different identity groups;
- absence of a vibrant civil society.

These root causes cover important areas, which may contribute to violent conflict. By locating them inside a country, however, one may tend to neglect the importance of external political and economic influences. They also omit issues of security such as arms flows and poorly controlled armed forces, which can play a central role in sparking and protracting violent conflict. The following outline of conflict factors retains the EU's basic distinction between the structural causes of conflict ("imbalance of opportunities") and the capacity to manage conflict in constructive ways ("illegitimate government, ineffective governance, conciliation mechanisms, civil society"). Security issues are added as a third root cause. Each major root cause is then broken down into a series of problem areas. It is important not to see these factors in isolation, but to look for their interrelationships and position them within their historical, regional, and cultural context.

1. **Structural sources of conflict** *(DAC 1998)*
   a) **Problems in managing transition and rapid change:** The dynamic forces of globalisation have induced rapid transition processes in many parts of the world. They include introduction of new technologies, exposure to global economic competition, decolonisation, structural adjustment programmes, transformations from authoritarian to more democratic regimes and from centrally planned to market economies. These changes often create profound social and political dislocations. Communities may experience impoverishment, marginalisation, and uprooting. Economically or politically motivated migration poses new challenges to intergroup relations and group cohesion. New communication media promote cultural homogenisation and cultural identities. New social groups are emerging who benefit from novel resources and opportunities, thereby changing the balance of power, antagonising other groups and challenging traditional structures of authority. Collapsing states and new forms of global economic integration foster war economies, which are based on pillage and trade in illegal commodities and maintained by the force of arms.
   b) **Widening socio-economic disparities:** Unbalanced economic growth and unequal distribution of its benefits can increase tensions as much as sudden economic decline. Disparities often exist in the geographical distribution of wealth between favoured and less dynamic regions or between urban centres and the rural hinterland. (Growing) wealth frequently trickles across classes and identity groups (clans, religious or ethnic communities) in a very unequal manner, particularly when these have unequal access to the state. Undue reliance of a country on a single export product increases the vulnerability of certain producer groups to fluctuations in world markets. Dynamic processes such as rural-urban migration can heighten the perception of disparity and add to tensions. Poor economic prospects can produce a generation of disaffected urban and rural youth, which lends itself to mobilisation by entrepreneurs who benefit from conflict.
   c) **Competition over natural resources:** Resource competition is an important cause of tension. Tensions develop not only over economic assets such as oil or precious stones, but also over vital resources such as land and water. Changing land tenure and water management systems, particularly those involving cross-border arrangements, can lead to disputes over the management, distribution and allocation of natural resources. Environmental degradation and man-made natural disasters can become pressing conflict factors, inducing large-scale population movements and increasing pressure on the remaining resources.
   d) **Political exploitation of cultural and other differences:** Although ethnic, religious and cultural differences themselves rarely cause conflicts, they lend themselves to political exploitation. Unbalanced growth and political transformation can create new or exacerbate existing regional imbalances, class differences or ethnic / religious stratification. Modernisation processes may also force the assimilation of minorities and undermine traditional authorities, which facilitated intergroup accommodation in the past. A further conflict factor is arbitrary colonial boundaries, which divide ethnic groups or create territorially compact minorities with aspirations to independent statehood.

2. **Capacity to deal with conflict constructively**
   a) **Legitimate government and good governance:** The conflict management capacity of the state largely depends on democratic processes and institutions which respect minority rights, allow expression of political dissent, and devolve authority to regions and communities. The government should be legitimate and representative. Only such a system can effectively integrate diverse groups into the state structure, identify common problems and achieve broad consensus on policy directions. Moreover, the state must be able to address the root causes of internal conflict by setting priorities, implementing policies and delivering services effectively. Transparency and accountability are central in this regard. States which only serve the interests of particular groups, or are too weak to deliver services at all, lose their integrative capacity and control of the political process.
   b) **Pluralism and participation:** Political pluralism and a functioning civil society can help reduce the probability of violent internal conflict. Tensions are unlikely to build up where there is space for citizens to become involved in and take control of the management of their own affairs. In this way, they can express their

concerns at an early stage, build coalitions to address shared problems, and achieve change in a non-confrontational constructive way. Certain disadvantaged groups may need support to increase their self-help and self-assertion capacities. Repressive regimes may stifle tensions until they erupt violently. In some cases, however, civil groups have actively participated in conflicts, as was witnessed in Rwanda in the 1994 genocide.

c) **Formal and informal channels of conflict management:** Conflicts between individuals and groups exist in every society and have the potential to bring about positive change. It is important, however, that people are able to access established procedures to seek justice or solve contentious issues. This requires a developed and impartial judicial system, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and support for traditional or modern procedures of mediation and arbitration. Where people cannot rely on an independent judiciary and the fairness of the law, or where traditional mediation is no longer respected, they are more likely to take up arms to defend their rights.

d) **Positive and negative international engagement:** In this age of globalisation, external forces often play a decisive role in destabilising a country and triggering internal conflicts. External actors can compete aggressively with weak economies, provide markets and trade routes for war economies, support partisan groups, or intervene militarily. Even well-meant foreign intervention such as humanitarian assistance can weaken a legitimate government by ignoring its regulatory and implementing functions. On the other hand, regional and international actors have an important role to play in developing cross-border resource management systems, regulating arms flows, mediation, peace-keeping, and supporting reconstruction efforts.

3. **Security risks**

a) **The legacy of violence:** A history of intergroup violence increases the likelihood that conflict will recur. War economies may be well established and difficult to convert. A climate of insecurity may inhibit private initiative and investment, thus hindering economic development and leaving certain groups even more vulnerable. The presence of large numbers of refugees and internally displaced people strains local economic systems and can fuel intergroup tensions. The experience of violence can lead to hatred and the desire for revenge and retaliation. Reconciliation, on the other hand, is a process that may require more than a generation to be completed.

b) **Arms proliferation and irregular fighters:** Ready availability of arms, particularly light weapons, enhances the likelihood of violence and fuels conflict. Arms become an economic asset for criminals and organised groups that use violent means to make a living. Such an economy of violence may protract conflict indefinitely. The mobilisation or presence of guerrilla forces, paramilitaries, personal armies and private security can increase the likelihood of violence. These forces are difficult to reintegrate into society as they may lack other marketable skills, fear reprisals, and are often ostracised within their own communities. Many regard war as their profession and perceive a need to continue with it to secure a livelihood.

c) **Uncontrolled police and military forces:** The armed forces often absorb large parts of the state budget, represent strong pressure groups in their own right, act independently of the legitimate authorities and even weaken them by counteracting their policies. Military coups threaten to overturn legitimate governments and plunge countries into protracted cycles of violence. As agents of state repression and sometimes carrying out extreme human rights violations, they can fuel resentment among excluded groups leading to armed opposition.

Conflict analysis can take place on the **macro level** (state, region, programme) or on the **micro level** (district, community, project). While the root causes of conflict remain the same, different issues come to the forefront in each case. Typical issues on the macro level are the nature of the political and judicial system, policies, legal frameworks, global economic integration, international engagement and security, questions of national identity, and the ability of civilians to manage and monitor the security forces. The same factors are experienced on the micro level, but are translated into the concrete practices of officials, traders, religious leaders, kinship groups etc. Closer to the ground, problems of migration, land rights, criminality, corruption, and intercommunal relations become more salient.

4.2.3 Conflict Indicators

Conflict indicators point the analyst towards the presence or absence of certain conflict factors. Appendices II and III contain examples of conflict indicators at the macro and micro level. These examples illustrate how the main root causes of conflict identified above can be translated into concrete indicators, suitable for ongoing monitoring. While some of the indicators may not appear to fuel tensions on their own, it is usually their combination which can spark conflict.

A distinction has been made between situations of submerged or rising tensions (pre-conflict) and post-conflict transitions. Post-conflict transitions present specific challenges, as war is likely to have deformed political and economic systems and left the social and psychological set-up of the population disturbed. On the other hand, post-conflict situations frequently offer an opportunity for political and economic reforms, which can improve a country's chances for long-term peace *(Ball / Halevy 1996)*. Therefore, specific indicators are needed to monitor these processes. However, they should be regarded as an addition rather than an alternative to the indicators listed for pre-conflict situations. For each case, examples of qualitative and quantitative indicators have been given.

Not all of the indicators listed in the appendices will be relevant to all conflict situations. Each situation has its own specificities, which need to be referenced to locally identified indicators. Therefore, it is important to develop participatory indicators formulated by those actually threatened or affected by violent conflict. These local perspectives are extremely valuable for understanding the full complexity of a conflict. The development of conflict indicators with local communities can be an important first step towards identifying peace-building goals which reflect a fairly wide consensus. Section 4.6. discusses the issues involved in indicator selection in greater detail.

4.2.4 Stakeholder Analysis

The first step in conflict analysis is directed towards identifying the main causes and issues of the conflict. Stakeholder analysis can broaden this perspective by looking at the main actors, their interests in and influence on the conflict in more detail. This is a crucial step towards formulating an effective peace-building strategy, which takes account of the political realities on the ground. Stakeholder analysis has attracted increasing interest in the policy and business sectors since the 1980s. ODA / DFID (1995) first introduced stakeholder analysis into development co-operation with the aim of promoting popular participation. Because of its sensitivity to the complex interplay between interests, power and participation, it is also an excellent tool for PCIA.

In this context, stakeholder analysis has a two-fold aim. First, it is a tool which allows a better understanding of the conflict environment by examining how the conflict affects different categories of people and what position they have in regard to it. Second, having analysed the root causes of conflict and the position of various groups towards conflict, stakeholder analysis can help develop a strategic approach towards conflict prevention, which builds on existing "peace constituencies" while being fully aware of the risks posed by other parties. On the project level, stakeholder analysis assists in formulating a strategy for involving various interest groups in project planning and implementation in order to achieve the best possible results for the intended beneficiaries.

Stakeholder analysis is a way of identifying the roles, capacities and agendas of those groups who have a "stake" in a certain situation or problem. In the context of development assistance, this is usually a programme or project, while for PCIA it is the conflict or one of its aspects. This enables practitioners to better understand the context of their work and plan strategically for the involvement of those who have the capacity to positively or negatively affect the conflict. In the language of stakeholder analysis, "stakeholders" are those groups who share a common interest as regards the conflict or are affected by it in a similar way. "Key stakeholders" are those who can significantly influence the conflict or are given priority by the development agency. They are also the central actors for peace. Stakeholder analysis provides a mapping of the key stakeholders, their relation to the root causes of conflict and to each other, their agendas and capacities, and ongoing peace efforts. Most usefully, it can be divided into four distinct steps *(cf. World Bank 1999)*:

1. **Identifying key stakeholders**

   Key stakeholders include the following groups:

   - **primary stakeholders**, whose lives are directly affected by the conflict (e.g. refugees, women, youth, ex-combatants, land mine victims);
   - **secondary stakeholders**, who play an intermediary role and have the potential to affect the conflict itself (e.g. government, security forces, non-state actors, political parties, civil society, religious leaders);
   - **external stakeholders**, who are not directly involved, but are an interested party to the conflict (e.g. regional governments, donor agencies, international private sector).

   In generating a list of key stakeholders, it is important to consider both victims and beneficiaries of the conflict as well as its supporters and opponents. Particular attention should be paid to vulnerable groups and relationships among stakeholders. Stakeholders can be individuals, communities, or organisations and also include donors and development agencies themselves.

2. **Determining stakeholder interests and peace agendas**

The second step is documenting the interests and peace agendas of each key stakeholder. This is not always an easy task as interests can be multiple, shifting or even in contradiction with the stated aims and objectives of an organisation or individual. It can be useful to relate the position of each stakeholder to the root causes of conflict and the way it is affected by the conflict itself. The following questions can provide some guidance:

- What is the stakeholder's position towards the conflict issues?
- How is the stakeholder affected by the conflict (consider negative and positive effects)? How does the stakeholder affect the conflict?
- What are the stakeholder's visions for peace? What are the main elements of his/her peace agenda (e.g. land reform, national autonomy)? Where does conflict arise with others?
- How may the stakeholder be prepared to contribute to a peace process? What resources may he/she be able and willing to mobilise?

3. **Determining stakeholder capacities**

Having mapped the key stakeholders and their interests, it is necessary to assess their capacities to affect the conflict in question. This requires information about their social, economic, political and legal status, their authority, control and relative negotiating position towards other stakeholders. Often those who are given highest priority by the development agency have the least capacity to influence what is happening to them. Others, who are not priority groups themselves, may have considerable power to facilitate, control or even negatively affect peace-building initiatives. Therefore, it is extremely important to examine the interrelationships between stakeholders.

- How far do stakeholders control resources or information?
- How are stakeholders organised? How can that organisation be influenced or built upon?
- What are the relationships between stakeholders? How and where do they interact? Who has power over whom? Who is dependent on whom?
- What capacities do the key stakeholders have which can support peace building or affect it negatively?

The aim of this exercise is to find out what roles the key stakeholders could assume in a process of peace-building, and when and how they could become involved.

4. **Formulating a participatory peace-building strategy**

The previous analysis should reveal entry points for peace-building as well as potential risks and "spoilers". It will also show which groups may require particular empowerment and assistance. This allows the formulation of a participatory peace-building strategy that builds on the interests and capacities of the key stakeholders and offers them concrete roles. The strategy should consider the timing and the processes of involvement of each group.

Stakeholder analysis can be conducted at the country level and at the project level. It is best carried out by a team, which can pool a wide range of information and clarify assumptions more easily. Although it is possible to conduct a desk-based stakeholder analysis relying on secondary information, its quality is greatly improved when it involves additional field research and consultations. As some information may be sensitive, a careful approach is required that does not unnecessarily expose stakeholders to risk. The results of this analysis can be fed into the objectives, assumptions and risks sections of the Logical Framework. It may be useful to invite other agencies to attend the stakeholder analysis to achieve a more coherent approach towards the conflict and better co-ordinate their practical work.

4.3 Planning

4.3.1 Integrated planning and measures

Having analysed the root causes of conflict, conflict trends and relevant actors, one can set objectives for a peace-building strategy. They need to address the root causes of conflict in a comprehensive way that takes account of their interdependence. Possible strategies to meet these objectives can be examined and developed. At this point, it is important to go beyond development co-operation and consider complementary trade, financial, diplomatic and military instruments. The aim is to achieve maximum coherence and synergy between the different forms of assistance. In this process, it is important to involve stakeholders and particularly to ensure representation of those most affected by the conflict.

Conflict prevention and peace-building strategies need to be operationalised in concrete programmes and projects, which address certain identified problems. There is a range of development initiatives, which have proven useful instruments to promote peace (also see *CPN/Lund 1998*). Appendix IV provides an overview of some of these measures and indicates at which stage of the conflict and for what purpose they may be most effective. The measures do not cover all the pressing needs in a conflict and post-conflict situation, but focus on those with special peace relevance. Post-conflict situations present specific challenges such as rebuilding war-torn societies, converting war economies, integrating refugees, demining and healing the wounds of

war. Therefore, activities specific to these situations have been listed separately, although they should be regarded as additions rather than alternatives to those suggested for situations of rising tensions. The list is not complete and has only illustrative value. The actual choice of measures to achieve the peace-building goals identified above needs to take into account the results of the stakeholder analysis, the capacity of the intervening agency, and the activities of other actors in the area.

At the end of the planning process, a conflict-sensitive country strategy should emerge, which outlines the main strategic issues, establishes a cascade of objectives from the macro level to the micro level and from the short term to the long term, identifies the main instruments and actors, and contains a realistic time frame. This document should be a consultative document and fit into national and interagency strategic plans. A similar process can be applied when designing individual development projects.

4.3.2 Conflict risk assessment

In politically unstable situations, conflict risk assessment should be an integral part of the project appraisal process. It aims to assess both the risk of the project actually exacerbating an existing conflict and the uncertainty which derives for the project from the conflict itself. Risk assessment should include the specific nature, location and timing of the project, the level of official and community support, as well as the capacity and political position of the counterpart or implementing organisation. Stakeholder consultations can play a central role in recognising and mitigating potential conflict risks.

The following risk indicators are mainly based on work by Bush (1998) and Reychler (1998). They should be regarded as examples, which need to be adapted to the local context.

Table 4: Indicators for conflict risk assessment at the project level

Issue	Risk Indicators
Location	• geographical extent of the project (site-specific, broad coverage) • status of territory (ambiguous, contested) • relationship between local community(ies) and central government • legacies of conflict in the area (physical security, war economy, food security, intergroup relations, physical and psychological health) • insufficient infrastructure
Timing	• present stage of the conflict • intensity of conflict in project area • anticipated political, economic and other developments that may affect project in future • opening / closing opportunity structures
Political, socio-economic and cultural context	• local, regional and national ownership of or support for the project • predictable political, legal and security structures • nature of political system and possible impact on project • politically sensitive issues involved in the project • external conditions such as Structural Adjustment Programmes • impact of conflict on local resources • cultural factors
Project structure	• capacity of implementing organisation / counterpart, qualified and suitable staff • involvement of implementing organisation in conflict or peace processes, its political position within the community • choice of beneficiaries and its political implications • capacity for flexibility and dealing with risks • conditions for effective implementation (leadership, co-ordination, timely disbursement of funds)

4.4 Ethical considerations

Working in conflict-affected environments poses complex challenges to development organisations not only in terms of capacity, but also of integrity. Even when providing "traditional" development assistance, agencies have to take decisions about partners, project location, and beneficiaries, which can all be highly political in divided societies. When conflict escalates, the actual scope for decision-making may shrink drastically, leading the organisation to profound practical and moral dilemmas. In this context, it is now increasingly acknowledged that "without clearly defined, systematic organisational policies and procedures the implementation of high quality programmes will not be possible" *(SPHERE 1998)*. There are now a growing number of efforts to define principles of operation, good practice or codes of conduct, which provide ethical and also practical guidance for agencies working in conflict situations. First results of these process include the **ICRC Code of Conduct** (1996), the **Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response** (1998) and the **Code of Conduct for Conflict Transformation Work** by International Alert (1998). These documents complement and operationalise the existing international standards of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law.

International Alert (1998) Guiding Principles for Conflict Transformation Work

- Primacy of people in transforming conflicts
- Humanitarian concern
- Human rights and humanitarian law and principles
- Respect for gender and cultural diversity
- Impartiality
- Independence
- Accountability
- Confidentiality
- Partnership
- Institutional learning

Such principles do not remove the onus of taking difficult decisions. However, they can help make the rationale for a specific course of action more transparent and thus enhance the organisation's accountability and legitimacy. When preparing and assessing individual decisions, Slim's (1997) framework for ethical analysis can provide useful guidance. In accordance with this framework, the following questions should be asked when making "tough choices":

- **Code of Ethics:** Is there a code of ethics which can be relied on? How much moral responsibility is the agency prepared to assume?
- **Balanced intentions:** Have different intentions and motivations (e.g. compassion, publicity, income) been balanced in an appropriate way?
- **Knowledge:** Has every effort been made to gather all information relevant to the decision?
- **Capacity:** Does the agency have the capacity to do anything about the situation at all?
- **Consultation:** Has every effort been made to consult, debate and weigh the various aspects of the problem?
- **Mitigation of negative aspects:** Has every effort been made to minimise any likelihood of negative impact or to limit the damage caused?
- **Organisational learning:** Are staff encouraged to develop their ethical skills and learn from past dilemmas?

4.5 Monitoring and Evaluation

A comprehensive PCIA system should include the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of programme and project activities. **Monitoring** is the process of gathering information throughout the life of a project to assess progress against plans and make decisions about changes. **Evaluation** involves assessing project performance against aims and objectives at a given point in time in order to learn from past experience and identify action points for future improvement. Monitoring and evaluation can focus on processes, outcomes and impact. **Process** M&E assesses the implementation of activities and whether – independently of the project activities – the way of implementation contributes to conflict. M&E of **outcomes** measures the effects of the activities being undertaken, particularly the more immediate, tangible or observable changes. **Impact** assessment aims to ascertain the more long-term and widespread changes that result from an intervention.

In the context of conflict prevention and peace-building, monitoring and evaluation fulfil a number of functions:

- assessing progress against the originally defined peace objectives;
- monitoring the initiative's impact on its environment, particularly any negative effects, and showing entry points to redress these;
- providing a learning tool for staff and partners;
- enhancing transparency and accountability towards beneficiaries and donors as regards the achievements and challenges faced by the initiative.

To ensure coherence, the same analytical tools and indicators should be used for the entire PCIA system. Beyond this, monitoring and evaluating peace-related activities poses specific challenges to the traditional approaches in this field *(Lederach 1997)*:

(i) **Focus on process:** In contrast to traditional aid, peace-building is centred on participative processes rather than on outputs, is a long-term path dotted with small successes and even more setbacks, and gives priority to (re-)building trust and relationships. The project approach of conventional aid is hardly appropriate in this situation as it may impose unrealistic time-frames and assumptions about the relationship between inputs and outcomes, which do not take account of the complexity of conflict and peace processes. Sometimes, it may be more important to sustain the process than to prematurely insist on concrete results. This means that monitoring and evaluation should pay more attention to process than to output. Monitoring is particularly important to keep track of the peace process, to register changes in the peace environment and respond proactively, and to perceive shortcomings of the project at an early stage in order to address problems.

(ii) **Role of project staff:** Monitoring and evaluation of peace-building activities should strongly integrate "peace workers", that is the staff, partners and local groups involved in the project. Considering the intangibility of peace processes, their knowledge and participation are indispensable to gain an understanding of the real constraints of the process, rationales for decision-making and progress achieved. Their expertise and participation are also indispensable in establishing process indicators and monitoring them in the course of their daily work. Monitoring should be introduced as a learning tool that is "owned" by all participants rather than an instrument of judgement and control from outside.

(iii) **Confidentiality:** Those who support peace processes must be prepared to take considerable risks and may face moral and political compromise. Peace work itself relies on building trust and spaces for dialogue, which also includes confidentiality. Therefore, a delicate balance needs to be struck between loyalty to partners and the needs for transparency. In this situation, informal and oral means of reporting and reflection have proved more useful than providing written evidence.

It can be useful to link the lessons learned from monitoring and evaluation to cross-cutting criteria, which are used by many donors. In a synthesis evaluation of peace-building activities, Spencer (1998) identified the following evaluation criteria, which are of particular relevance to activities in conflict-affected areas.

Evaluation criteria for conflict prevention and peace-building *(Spencer 1998)*

- Appropriateness
- Timeliness
- Coherence
- Co-ordination
- Connectedness
- Cost-effectiveness
- Coverage
- Output / Impact Relation
- Accountability
- Transparency
- Sustainability
- Trust
- Ownership
- Commitment.

4.6 Methodological issues

Indicators for conflict prevention and peace-building

Setting indicators for conflict prevention and peace-building projects poses special problems because of the difficulty of ascertaining and measuring peace itself. Perhaps more than traditional development co-operation, conflict prevention and peace-building activities seek to directly affect the local socio-political situation. Therefore, indicators need to reflect directly the project's impact on its local or national environment. Much can be learnt from the related areas of human rights, democracy, and good governance, for which indicator systems have already been developed *(Kapoor 1996, SIDA 1997)*. Progress has also been made in evaluating peace-building work *(Laprise 1998, CPCC 1999)*. This body of work has highlighted the following issues, which apply both to macro- and micro-level indicators:

(i) **Long-term time frame:** Establishing lasting peace in a region is a long-term process, which cannot easily be measured with traditional indicators. Changes may be subtle and difficult to capture, and even the end goal may remain elusive. PCIA will therefore need to rely on "intermediate", "proxy" or "directional" indicators which can give information about changes associated with the ultimate goal without pre-empting it *(DFID / Warner 1999)*. Indicators and criteria for success should also take account of the high risks involved in peace-building work.

(ii) **Consistency and flexibility:** For maximum coherence, a project needs to rely on a consistent tree of objectives and related indicators. On the other hand, it is necessary to have sufficiently flexible tools to capture the often rapid changes in a conflict situation and modify the intervention appropriately. Therefore, a balance needs to be struck between a core of fixed objectives and performance indicators, and additional sets of more flexible and context-specific indicators.

(iii) **Causality and attribution:** Development activities can play only a modest role in influencing the course of conflicts. This poses the question of causality and attributing (positive) changes. Laprise (1998) suggests addressing this problem by recording positive (or negative) developments on the macro level (without however appropriating them, that is, claiming that they are due to the particular programme) and to evaluate the outcomes of individual projects with more traditional methods. This approach has the advantage of offering some insight into the general development of the situation, while remaining realistically modest about the programme's impact.

(iv) **Mix of quantitative, qualitative and participatory indicators:** Progress towards peace may be difficult to measure in quantitative terms. It is therefore advisable to use a mix of quantitative, qualitative and participatory indicators *(Kapoor 1996)*. These have different strengths and weaknesses. Quantitative indicators may be objective and are often relatively easy to collect and interpret. Complex social and political institutions and processes may be better captured by qualitative indicators, which also permit greater levels of disaggregation. Participatory indicators seek to elicit the perspectives and priorities of the stakeholders. There should be sufficient flexibility in the choice and actual use of indicators according to the local situation. Best results are usually achieved by evidence triangulation, which brings together the insights of multiple stakeholders.

(v) **Unintended impact:** Indicators are usually agreed at the beginning of a programme or project. They are therefore ill-suited to account for the unintended or unplanned outcomes and impacts of an intervention *(Goyder et al. 1998)*. In order to capture such developments, the project design should include special indicators monitoring vulnerable groups, intergroup relations related to the intervention, and its distributional and environmental impact. Indicators monitoring the project process and output can also give hints on the ways in which the project delivery causes unforeseen developments. However, intensive dialogue between all stakeholders may be better suited to detect such problems than the pure monitoring of indicators.

(vi) **Learning tool and ownership:** Indicators are most successful as a tool for learning and guidance when they are "owned" by all stakeholders. They should therefore be as simple and straightforward as possible, and easy to verify. Flexibility is required to integrate changing project objectives and environmental conditions.

Verification methods

Conflict indicators are best verified at several levels and with different methods *(Brusset 1999a)*.

(i) **Macro level:** The level of national policy-making can provide information about government activities (e.g. major infrastructure, armament) and political projects (e.g. legal initiatives). The reliability of quantitative information available (e.g. production statistics) may be questionable. Political and economic trends may be observed with relative ease, as historical records and news archives are often available. Diplomats, political observers, economists, journalists and technical co-operation units are often best placed to monitor the macro-level.

(ii) **Micro level:** At district, village and field operational level, more reliable and valid information can be obtained, but with more difficulty. It has often been observed that figures on, for example, refugees flows are more reliable the more one approaches the actual lines of movement. Local officials away from the capital may be more outspoken in public, but also cautious with foreign visitors. Although the micro level provides a wealth of detailed information, possible lack of historical records may make it more difficult to perceive important trends and developments. Most micro-level information is qualitative, and sufficient time needs to be allowed for its collection and interpretation. Among expatriates, long-term residents such as aid workers, business or professional people, and anthropologists are often best placed to monitor this level. It is essential, however, to involve local people in the process of gathering and analysing information. As peace-related work may attract suspicion from official authorities, both local and expatriate informants need to be protected against reprisals. This may be achieved by publishing information at a very high level of synthesis.

(iii) **Information flow:** Conflict monitoring can be optimised when information travels smoothly between the different levels of an organisation and between the organisations operating in the same region or country. The conflict monitoring capacity of a legitimate government itself can be strengthened by supporting national statistics and data bases.

A tool box for social impact assessment
(World Bank 1999)

- **Analytical tools:** Conflict analysis, Stakeholder analysis, Gender analysis
- **Community-based methods:** Participatory Rural Appraisal, SARAR
- **Consultation methods:** Beneficiary assessment
- **Observation and interview tools:** Participant observation, Semi-structured interviews, Focus group meetings, Village meetings, Secondary data review
- **Participatory methods:** Role playing, Wealth ranking, Access to resources, Analysis of tasks, Mapping, Needs assessment exercise, Pocket charts, Tree diagrams
- **Workshop-based methods:** Objectives-oriented project planning, TeamUp

The value and risks of participation

There is a need to "translate" peace-building into locally meaningful terms and take account of local priorities. It is generally agreed *(Kapoor 1996)* that participatory planning can considerably enhance the ownership of a programme or project among stakeholders (including project staff) and thus contribute to its effectiveness and sustainability. Drawing on ActionAid's experiences, *Goyden et al (1998)* suggest that the participative process of identifying indicators is eventually more important in terms of capacity building and empowerment than the indicators themselves. The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda *(Vol. 3, 1996)* argues that local people appreciated it when they were consulted on the questions concerning their immediate livelihood and that consultations greatly enhanced the quality of aid delivery. The identification of peace-building objectives and indicators should therefore be as participative as possible.

This can, however, pose particular problems in conflict situations. When quick decisions are required in conflict situations, participation can appear cumbersome and consume much valuable time of both the planners and the "beneficiaries". Moreover, conflict situations often present serious practical limitations on participatory approaches. Joint planning workshops, for example, may not be advisable when extreme violence has deeply divided the population. In such a situation, compromise will be difficult to achieve through public negotiations, and the workshop itself may spark rivalries. Factions in the conflict may try to shield disadvantaged and vulnerable groups from the researchers, or these people could risk reprisals for speaking to outsiders. There is also the danger of raising false expectations *(Hallam 1998:73-78)*. Participative approaches should, therefore, be handled with great sensitivity and be carefully matched to real planning needs.

V. Conclusion: a framework for PCIA

This paper draws the lessons from current approaches to conflict prevention and peace-building in development work, outlines the need for a more systematic approach to integrating a conflict perspective into development planning and presents the elements for a PCIA system.

The literature suggests that PCIA should be an integrated tool that supports decision-makers in **analysing information** and **making strategic choices** for development work in areas at risk of violent conflict. The aim is to promote development activities that are designed to mitigate the risk of conflict and advance peace. PCIA achieves its full potential when it is integrated into the Project Cycle Management (PCM) or similar frameworks. As to the PCM itself, it should be an instrument that allows for the consultation and participation of a wide range of stakeholders. The following steps outline the main elements of a PCIA tool:

I Developing a country strategy

1. **Conflict analysis**
   Conflict analysis provides a picture of the country's conflict risks and identifies the main root causes of (potential) conflict at the macro and micro level. Conflict analysis also includes an assessment of conflict trends and peace opportunities. Conflict indicators are identified to monitor the progress of a country's situation towards peace or conflict. Because of its strategic importance, it is desirable to achieve a shared analysis of the main conflict issues and trends with a wide range of interested parties.

2. **Stakeholder analysis**
   Planning can be improved by systematically looking at the stakeholders in the conflict, identifying their positions towards it, and their capacities for peace. Stakeholders at the local, national, regional and international level should be considered, including those who actually wage war. This allows the identification of actors best suited to address the main conflict factors on the basis of their capacities and alignment. A mapping exercise can contribute to greater co-ordination between the different agencies when it is conducted in a participative manner.

3. **Choice of strategic objectives and instruments**
   From the analysis of the major root causes of conflict, the conflict trends and relevant actors, strategic peace objectives can be set. These need to address the main root causes of conflict in a comprehensive way that takes account of their interdependence. It can then be determined what instruments are best suited to implement strategic objectives. At this point, it is important to go beyond development co-operation and consider complementary trade, financial, diplomatic and military instruments. The aim is to achieve maximum coherence and synergy between the different forms of intervention.

4. **Drawing up a country strategy**
   The country strategy should clearly outline the main strategic issues, establish a cascade of objectives from the macro level to the micro level and from the short term to the long term, identify the main instruments and actors, and refer to a realistic time frame.

II Project planning and appraisal

5. **Risk assessment**
   When appraising a project proposal in a situation of potential conflict, consultations with project stakeholders play a central role in recognising and mitigating potential conflict risks. Conflict also poses a high risk to the intervention itself. Risk assessment should include the specific nature, location and timing of the intervention as well as the level of official and community support for it.

III Project implementation and evaluation

6. **Conflict indicators for monitoring and evaluation**
   The conflict indicators established during the conflict analysis and project appraisal should guide the monitoring and evaluation of the intervention. The way in which the project is implemented calls for special attention, and flexibility is required to address its unintended effects.

Appendix I Institutional capacity building for conflict prevention among major donors

Table 5: Mainstreaming conflict prevention and peace-building among major donors

Institution	Institutional Capacity	Policy Frameworks	Policy Tools	Policy Instruments
OECD / DAC	Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development	Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, 1998	n / a	n / a
European Commission	DG I, DG Ia, DG Ib, DG VIII ECHO Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (from 1999) Quality Support Group Conflict Prevention Network	*The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa*, 1996 *Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development*, 1996 *Democratisation, Rule of Law, Respect for Human Rights and Good Governance*, 1998 *Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution*, 1998	Inter-Service Consultations (RELEX) Logical Framework / Project Cycle PCIA Practitioner's Manual Early Warning methodologies Training programme "Conflict Prevention in Africa"	Regional Aid Policy Frameworks (Lomé, PHARE, TACIS, MEDA, ALA) Specialised budget lines (e.g. rehabilitation, refugees) ECHO emergency assistance
World Bank	Post-Conflict Unit Global Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Network Operations Evaluation Department World Bank Institute	*Articles of Agreement*, amended 1989 *Post-Conflict Reconstruction. The Role of the World Bank*, 1998	Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) Eligibility Criteria for Post-Conflict Assistance Performance Indicators Watching Brief Process Transitional Support Strategy Process (TSS) Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) Conflict Assessment Impact Analysis (CAIA) Evaluation Research Staff training	IBRD Loans IDA Credits Learning and Innovation Loans Post-Conflict Fund Japanese Post-Conflict Fund Trust Funds
OSCE	High Commission on National Minorities Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Conflict Prevention Centre	*Helsinki Final Act* (1975) *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* (1990) *Document-Charter on European Security* (1996) *Helsinki II Summit: The Challenge of Change*, 1999	n / a	Fact-finding and rapporteur missions Long-term missions Ad hoc steering groups Mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes Peacekeeping operations
Belgian Administration for Development Co-operation	Department for Evaluation and Policy Development, Conflict and Peace Unit	n / a	Country Strategy Paper Internal Co-ordination Meetings PCIA (in preparation)	Post-Conflict Fund Advocacy Work on Light Weapons and Arms Trade
DFAIT / CIDA (Canada)	Peace-building and Human Security Division (DFAIT) International Humanitarian Assistance Division (CIDA) Pearson Institute Peacekeeping Centre	*Canadian Peace-building Initiative Strategic Framework*, 1999	Policy Framework Regional Strategy Country Planning Strategic Document Risk / Conflict Analysis Peace & PCIA	Bi- and multilateral programmes Partnership programmes (NGOs) Canadian Peace-building Initiative Peace-building Fund (CIDA) Peace-building Program (DFAIT) Peacekeeping Missions

Table 5: Mainstreaming conflict prevention and peace-building among major donors *(...continued)*

Institution	Institutional Capacity	Policy Frameworks	Policy Tools	Policy Instruments
DFAIT / CIDA (Canada)	Peace-building and Human Security Division (DFAIT) International Humanitarian Assistance Division (CIDA) Pearson Institute Peacekeeping Centre	*Canadian Peace-building Initiative Strategic Framework*, 1999	Policy Framework Regional Strategy Country Planning Strategic Document Risk / Conflict Analysis Peace & PCIA	Bi- and multilateral programmes Partnership programmes (NGOs) Canadian Peace-building Initiative Peace-building Fund (CIDA) Peace-building Program (DFAIT) Peacekeeping Missions
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Denmark)	Intra-Governmental Committee on Peace Issues Peace and Stability Secretariat	in preparation	Sector programmes Logical Framework Project Appraisal Criteria Planning Guidelines Poverty Assessment	Development Assistance Peace and Stability Fund Assistance to Eastern Europe and the FSU (esp. Baltics) Peacekeeping Missions
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Finland)	Department for Development Co-operation, Department for Political Affairs / Security Policy Advisor for Conflict Issues and Democracy	*Finland's Policy on Relations with Developing Countries*, Oct. 1998 Country Strategy	Guidelines for Programme Design, Monitoring and Evaluation, 1998 Terms of Reference for Evaluations Research co-operation with Finnish universities	Target Country Programmes Humanitarian Assistance (special funds for conflict prevention) Democracy Funds Peacekeeping Missions
Ministry for Economic Co-operation (Germany)	Conflict Prevention Advisor	in preparation	Crisis analysis in development co-operation (Framework), 1998 Pilot evaluation of "Impact of Development Co-operation in Crisis Situations", 1999	Country Programmes Sectoral Programmes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands)	Directorate for Humanitarian Assistance and Crisis Management, Division for Conflict Prevention and Management	Poverty Framework	Country Task Forces Country Policy Frameworks "Conflict Prognosis Model" Project Appraisal and Evaluation Criteria	Conflict Prevention Fund (within Humanitarian Assistance budget) Peace Aid (flexible, high-risk) Sector / Programme Funding
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Norway)		*Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance*, Jan. 1999 Democracy-Building in Peace Processes (forthcoming)		Peace-building focus within Humanitarian Assistance Advocacy work on small arms and anti-personnel mine ban convention
SIDA (Sweden)	Division for Humanitarian Assistance, Dept. for Co-operation with NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance Advisor for Conflict Management	*Strategy for Conflict Management and Peace-Building*, 1999 *Justice and Peace. SIDA's Programme for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights*, 1997	Project Appraisal Criteria Conflict Analysis (macro) Impact Analysis (LogFrame) Conflict Prevention Evaluation Criteria (in preparation) Staff training	Conflict prevention part of humanitarian budget
Fed. Dept. of Foreign Affairs (Switzerland)	Political Direction, Section for Peace Policy Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation	*Beyond the Relief-Development Continuum*, 1997 *Report of the Federal Council on Swiss Foreign Policy in the 1990s*	Working Group "Conflict Prevention and Conflict Mediation" Country Strategy Conflict Monitoring and Analysis Tools (FAST, EPUM)	Contingency Management System Target Country Programmes Budget line for peace promoting activities
DfID (UK)	Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD), Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Section	Conflict reduction and humanitarian assistance, 1999 Poverty and the security sector, 1999	Country Strategy Paper PCIA (in preparation) Staff Training	Regional Programmes CHAD Budget

(Source: own interviews, Ball 1999, Costy 1999)

Appendix II Indicators for macro-level conflict analysis

Table 6

Thematic Area	Situation of submerged or rising tensions	Post-conflict transition
1. Structural sources of conflict		
Problems in managing transition and rapid change	• sweeping political and economic reforms • rapid economic growth / decline • changing political or economic elites • technological revolutions negatively affecting some parts of the population • high or increasing macro-economic instability • migration and resettlement of large populations or significant identity groups	• progress of economic and social restructuring • degree of legitimacy and capacity of customary structures for post-conflict reconstruction • large-scale displacements and refugee flows • progress in converting the war economy
Widening socio-economic disparities	• widespread or rising poverty, unemployment, inflation, low or decreasing food security • privatisation of social services combined with decreasing income-earning opportunities • marked or growing social stratification and income disparities • marked or increasing inequalities in wealth between identity groups (ethnic, religious, regional etc.)	• progress in rebuilding livelihoods destroyed by war, hunger, disease • new conspicuous income disparities between war profiteers and ordinary population • sufficient level of education and employment for disaffected "war generation" to build new lives • support programmes for war widows, war orphans etc.
Competition over natural resources	• high or rising population pressure on land • marked or increasing disparities in land / water distribution • agricultural failure • growing pollution, environmental disaster • high level or increasing incidence of court battles over land ownership • ecological, economic and other threats to survival of an identity group	• amount of pollution and destruction of natural resources by war • advance in negotiations on new resource-management systems • progress in clearing land mines and opening up land for agricultural use
Political exploitation of cultural and other differences	• historical rivalries and territorial disputes frequently discussed in private and public • (recent changes in) legislation which culturally discriminate against minorities (e.g. language laws) • independence and balance of media threatened • high or increasing prominence of exclusionary nationalist / religious propaganda in public • defamation of certain social groups in media and public discourse, deterioration of mutual perception as a result of adopting negative stereotypes • low degree of or declining interaction and communication between social groups in daily life	• progress of reconciliation process: increase in cross-cutting organisations, desegregated education, intermarriage • decrease in enemy images and stereotypes in media • success in overcoming desire for revenge and promoting mutual trust

Table 6 *(…continued)*

Thematic Area	Situation of submerged or rising tensions	Post-conflict transition
2. Capacity to deal with conflict constructively		
Legitimate government and good governance	• contested government legitimacy • "power politics" tend to replace broad national consensus • continued or increasing pattern of severe constitutional abuses and abuses of power • high or increasing tensions between central and regional administration • low or reduced government management capacity • high or increasing levels of corruption • territories with incomplete or contested state control • long-standing or growing domination of ethnic, religious, or regional group(s) in politics • long-standing or increasing discrimination against vulnerable or minority groups • frequent or increasing cases of institutionalised persecution of minorities	• success in integrating former armed opposition into political process • degree of influence security forces retain over political process • degree of competition or collaboration between pre-war and post-war elites • process and results of post-conflict elections reflecting new national consensus • arrangements for minority protection and power sharing integrated in constitution • implementation of peace accords • gradual restitution of government services • degree to which "peace dividend" is delivered equitably • capacity of civilians to manage and monitor security forces
Pluralism and participation	• low level of trust in or growing disaffection with political leaders • low degree of or decreasing independence and political participation of civil society • little experience with representative, participatory government and democracy • unfair election procedures (fraud, voter intimidation) • rise of militant opposition, formation of armed wings	• progress of confidence building between former warring parties • successful conversion of former rebel groups into political parties • attitude of new political coalitions and interest groups towards peace process • degree of political decentralisation and devolution
Channels for conflict management	• institutional bias of judiciary and police, weak judicial independence • low degree of respect for the rule of law • number of political prisoners • freedom of expression and public debate curtailed • history of state repression • undermined legitimacy of traditional authorities • high or increasing number of non-violent and violent protests • lack of cross-cutting local or horizontal organisations (e.g. mixed schools)	• ways of dealing with major war criminals (e.g. war tribunals, impunity) • degree of popular trust and confidence in mediation attempts • range of public discussion about the past, truth commissions or other fora for justice and reconciliation • decreasing internal opposition to peace process
Positive and negative international engagement	• large-scale flight of foreign and domestic capital • negative influence of foreign business interests • development of regional trade networks in illegitimate goods • political changes in neighbouring countries • new external support for opposition groups • pronounced threat of foreign intervention	• degree of stabilising role of regional and international peacekeeping forces • progress in implementing cross-border arrangements • continuing regional demand and supply for war economy

Table 6 *(…continued)*

Thematic Area	Situation of submerged or rising tensions	Post-conflict transition
2. Security risks		
Legacy of violence	• history of unresolved armed conflict • high or rising levels of violent crime and kidnapping • low-intensity political and ethnic violence • high or increasing number of political assassinations • parts of population share positive attitude towards violence	• ongoing climate of insecurity • number of continuing extra-judicial killings • continuing presence of "culture of violence" • incidence of war trauma in population • rising incidence of domestic violence
Arms proliferation and irregular fighters	• growing or well-established illicit arms trade • high or increasing pattern of private arming • presence of guerrilla groups and private armies • high or rising number of private security firms	• high level of light weapons proliferation • progress of arms decommissioning • level of criminality • progress of demobilisation and reintegration • number of youth involved in acts of violence
Uncontrolled state armed forces	• high or expanding proportion of security expenditure in national budgets • strong or rising presence of security forces in the streets • high or increasing number of human rights abuses • low popular trust in or growing popular disillusionment with security apparatus	• progress of security sector reform • changing attitude in military towards loss of status and funding • progress in establishing civil control over demobilised armed forces

(compiled from Davis/Gurr 1997, FEWER 1999, Laprise 1998, OECD 1998, Spelten 1998, DFID/Warner 1999 and others)

Appendix III Indicators for micro-level conflict analysis

Table 7

Thematic Area	Conflict indicators
1. Structured sources of conflict	
Problems in managing transition and rapid change	• appropriation of development assistance by privileged groups • new technologies (e.g. farming practices) only benefit certain groups • negative impact of rural-urban migration (e.g. tensions between older and younger generation)
Widening socio-economic disparities	• negative effects of reduced government expenditure on availability of local infrastructure and services • presence of clientelist systems posing distinct identity groups (kin, ethnic, religious) against each other • long-standing or deepening social differentiation according to ethnic / religious lines • overlap between labour and ethnic conflicts
Competition over natural resources	• disputed land ownership and boundary demarcation • conflicting land use goals (e.g. agriculture, mining, conservation) • negative ecological effects of existing land tenure arrangements (e.g. encouragement of unsustainable farming practices leading to long-term degradation) • disputes caused by depletion of natural resources (e.g. fish, water) due to pollution and overexploitation • encroachment by stronger group on the natural resources of a more vulnerable group
Political exploitation of cultural and other differences	• disrespect for or repression of local culture and values by central authorities • disputes over local history and territorial rights • disputes over language use in administration and education • making scapegoats of "outsiders"
2. Capacity to deal with conflict constructively	
Legitimate government and good governance	• exclusionary or unrepresentative local power structures • unfair procedures and results of local elections (e.g. fraud) • reduced (or sometimes high) political and budgetary autonomy of the local government • access to government funds and services restricted to certain social groups (e.g. nepotism, ethnic networks) • political and economic discrimination against local groups (e.g. indigenous groups, religious sects, linguistic minorities) • customary authorities appropriated and undermined by powerful partisan interests
Pluralism and participation	• lack of co-operation between communities • absence of neighbourhood, religious, cultural or other local organisations • elites control local media
Channels for conflict management	• restricted independence of local courts (e.g. influence of local elites, favouritism, corruption) • customary law contradicting basic human rights and legal standards (e.g. forms of punishment, discrimination against marginalised groups) • undermined authority of local mediators (e.g. religious leaders)
Positive and negative international engagement	• falling world market prices for local export products • development projects disregard local authorities and foster alternative centres of power • development projects bring latent conflict issues to the forefront

Table 7 *(…continued)*

Thematic Area	Conflict indicators
3. Security risks	
Legacy of violence	• strong local memories of violence and persecution • grievances between groups related to past conflict • families and kin groups divided by previous conflict • incidence of domestic violence
Arms proliferation and irregular fighters	• frequent resort to violence to solve everyday conflicts • high level of criminality, feeling of insecurity • men carry weapons as part of daily attire • irregular armed groups levy extra taxes on population • pillage of villages by irregular fighters • control of local markets by rackets
Uncontrolled state armed forces	• human rights abuses • corruption and private enrichment (e.g. extortion) by police and armed forces • intimidation of population through random violence

(compiled from Oxfam 1997, Spelten 1998, DFID / Warner 1999 and others)

Appendix IV Measures for conflict prevention and peace building

Table 8: Peace-building approaches in pre- and post-conflict situations

Thematic Area	Situation of submerged or rising tensions	Post-conflict transition
1. Structural sources of conflict		
Problems in managing transition and rapid change	**Economic stability and economic reform** • support trade agreements and financial mechanisms stabilising the national economy, particularly through diversification • strengthen government's capacity to regulate foreign investment in accordance with national development priorities • monitor and support transformation of economy to avert undesired outcomes **Migration and resettlement** • assist development of legal framework for rapid social and economic integration of migrants • support social cohesion and cultural identity within migrant community • promote economic and cultural exchange between migrants and host society	**Social cohesion** • support broad participation in political process, labour market and national civil society • encourage political power-sharing arrangements to avoid brisk shifts of political balance • strengthen customary structures that can play positive role in peace process **Reintegration of refugees and displaced persons** • support area-based rehabilitation and reintegration schemes to avoid undue exclusion of certain groups • make return areas safe (e.g. demining) • assist in clarifying land rights situation • develop basic infrastructure (e.g. water, roads, tools) • provide agricultural inputs for food production • offer special education and employment programmes for potentially destabilising groups (e.g. youth)
Widening socio-economic disparities	**Equitable economic development** • use development resources to redress regional inequalities • mitigate ethnic / social inequalities in benefiting from growth and vulnerability to decline • prioritise social investment (health, education, water / sanitation) **Meet basic human needs** • food security • safety nets for the vulnerable • access to housing and infrastructure **Reduce social exclusion** • create better opportunities for the disadvantaged • enhance education and professional training • facilitate access to land, capital and credit	**Equal participation in "peace dividend"** • legal frameworks and instruments against profiteering and speculation • good governance to convert economic growth into tangible benefits for whole population • debt relief under condition of clear commitments to use freed resources for poverty reduction **Conversion of war economy** • reduce profits from war economy through strict controls and drying up markets (e.g. arms, drugs trade) • support legitimate economic activities and trade • education and employment, particularly for youth • peace-oriented infrastructure (transport, communications, health, education, formal markets)

Table 8: Peace-building approaches in pre- and post-conflict situations *(...continued)*

Thematic Area	Situation of submerged or rising tensions	Post-conflict transition
Competition over natural resources	**Enhance environmental security** • reduce pressure on natural resources (e.g. alternative fuels) • reduce pollution • optimise use of existing resources **Sustainable resource management systems** • monitor changes in resource management, e.g. logging and community forestry programmes • support viable customary land tenure and resource management systems • support developments of sustainable local, national and cross-border arrangements on resource use (e.g. water) • create appropriate legal frameworks	**Agreement on sustainable resource management systems as central part of peace process** • facilitate negotiations • provide technological and financial support to resource management agreements **Environmental rehabilitation** • demining • reforestation • soil rehabilitation
Political exploitation of cultural and other differences	**Constructive social dialogue and co-operation** • economic integration and exchange • residential desegregation • projects promoting common interests and collaboration of divided groups • promotion of existing areas of unity, consensus, and mutual interest • cross-cutting cultural, youth, sport etc. initiatives • peace education and cross-cultural training • training for communicators (journalists, teachers)	**Culture of peace and reconciliation** • bringing people together out of common interest ("functional accommodation") • education and exchange programmes for overcoming negative stereotypes • confidence building, particularly for youth • religious / spiritual reconciliation
2. Capacity to deal with conflict constructively		
Legitimate government and good governance	**Democratic processes** • encourage constitutional reform if overly undemocratic or discriminatory • assist and monitor democratic institutions (e.g. courts, legislative bodies, executive) • assist representative political institutions (e.g. political parties) **Public institutions** • support establishment of a clear division of tasks between central, regional and local government based on comparative advantage and maximum civil participation • strengthen public administration and effective delivery of government services • civil service reform for more impartiality and accessibility, strengthen representation of marginalised groups in civil service • encourage transparency and accountability of state organs, anti-corruption measures **Political reform and stability** • strengthen legitimate and reasonably democratic government through acknowledgement of its development priorities and support for implementing them • allow time for evolutionary processes and provide space for local solutions	**Establishing a legitimate and participative political system** • support restoration of government functions and attraction of specialists into government • strengthen legislature • support and monitor elections and referenda, informing the electorate about their rights • support legitimate local authorities • support civilian control over political and economic affairs

Table 8: Peace-building approaches in pre- and post-conflict situations *(...continued)*

Thematic Area	Situation of submerged or rising tensions	Post-conflict transition
Pluralism and participation	**Popular participation in political process** • encourage administrative decentralisation • strengthening intermediary bodies (e.g. regional parliaments, local councils) • support civic / religious organisations, encompassing political divisions • promote political human rights **Protection of minority groups** • assist development and implementation of a legal framework for minority protection (e.g. cultural autonomy) • promote power-sharing and other forms of minority political participation **Freedom of information** • strengthen commitment of media to objective information • assist elaboration of a legal framework for independent and free media • strengthen independent national and local media institutions • organise professional training for local journalists and editors • dialogue with state and other actors to increase understanding of free media and encourage material, financial and legal assistance **Civil society** • strengthen local arbitration and mediation skills • build political space for local processes and solutions	**Strengthen civil control of political processes** • strengthen structures of participation and decision-making, from local to regional level • aid agencies to adopt measures to entrench the rights of local people to participate in discussions and decisions that affect their lives • strengthen the voices of the marginalised and vulnerable **Civil society for conflict resolution and reconciliation** • support moderate civic fora and organisations • strengthen non-exclusive social networks • support local mediation efforts • help establish "safe spaces" for non-confrontational dialogue • offer facilitation and mediation training • promote culture of dispute resolution
Channels for conflict management	**Systems of justice** • advocate reform of law and justice institutions (e.g. courts, ombudsman, civilian police forces, prison services) • strengthen legitimate customary dispute resolution systems • facilitate access to legal system, especially for the marginalised **Rule of law and human rights** • monitor impartiality of judiciary • assist human-rights monitoring and reporting • offer human-rights training and advocacy • support for human rights groups	**Judicial and legal reform** • promote systematised and fair dispute settlement • strengthen equal application of law for all **Justice for victims of war and violence** • advocate International Criminal Tribunal to end impunity of war criminals • support truth commissions • encourage public dialogue on the past • support the victims of violence

Table 8: Peace-building approaches in pre- and post-conflict situations *(...continued)*

Thematic Area	Situation of submerged or rising tensions	Post-conflict transition
Positive and negative international engagement	**Reduce external support for conflict** • facilitate political dialogue with third countries • incentives and sanctions to discourage conflict-promoting involvement **Prevent conflict spilling over into neighbouring countries** • address root causes of potential conflict in neighbouring states • reduce cross-border mobility • alleviate impact of refugee populations on host countries	**Regional security initiatives** • support regional initiatives for arms control • strengthen regional mechanisms for conflict prevention and peace-building • assist regional management of shared natural resources • enhance capacities and skills of regional organisations • strengthen links between civil society in the region
3. Security risks		
Legacy of violence	**Individual and collective security** • strengthen control of criminal violence • protection against banditry and organised crime • delegitimise political violence **Transform the "culture of violence"** • delegitimise glorification of violence in public discourse and the media (e.g. training, regulations) • promote idea of peaceful conflict resolution • transform gender stereotypes (e.g. violent masculinity)	**Healing the wounds of war** • health services • rehabilitation programmes for the disabled • psycho-social counselling for war trauma • reuniting families and communities
Arms proliferation and irregular fighters	**Control of (small) arms proliferation** • implementation of strict national licensing system • control of internal and cross-border arms trade • EU countries to uphold and strengthen existing agreements for preventing and combating illicit trafficking in conventional arms **Monitor private and opposition armed formations** • legal frameworks and codes of conduct for private security companies • encourage dialogue with radical opposition groups • support efforts against terrorism	**Clearing of land mines** • creating local capacity for demining • mine-awareness programmes • care for the victims of land mines **Disarmament** • practical support for weapons decommissioning (e.g. weapons-for-job programme) • offer amnesty and economic alternatives to violence **Demobilisation and social reintegration of former combatants** • cantonment, discharge, re-insertion and reintegration (social benefits, vocational training, employment schemes, counselling) • disband paramilitary organisations
Uncontrolled state armed forces	**Security sector reform** • help reduce excessive military expenditure through objective risk assessments and more effective organisation of armed forces • redefine doctrine of security forces towards constructive role in democratic society, reform education of military and police forces • strengthen public accountability and civilian control over armed forces, e.g. ombudsman, civilian review boards	**Define new role for military in post-war society** • support building of national, accountable and professional armies ensuring security of all citizens • evaluate officers of former security forces / armed opposition before induction into new forces • train police and military forces for role in democratic society, including respect for human rights and standards of professional conduct

(compiled from Anderson 1999, Ball / Halevy 1996, Bush 1998, DFAIT / CIDA 1998, DFID 1999, Goodhand / Hulme 1997, OECD 1998, Oxfam 1997, Stiefel 1998, DFID / Warner 1999)

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